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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis builds a network representation of the U.S. financial system using data 
that is processed automatically from the U.S. Federal Reserve. We develop computational 
tools to import and clean the overall quarterly holding amounts in the financial accounts 
of the United States Z.1 report for the current and historical quarters. We use this curated 
data to create a network representation of the financial system and then to analyze the 
network to identify the most important monies and players based on rankings, analysis of 
network structure, and visualizations of different dimensions of the network. By studying 
this network structure, we obtain insight into potential vulnerabilities and changes in the 
financial system over time. 
v 
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Executive Summary
Warfare is continually evolving, andmodernwarfare incorporates hybrid elements that often
target important infrastructure to achieve military goals. The financial system is a critical
infrastructure sector; we rely upon it, whether explicitly or implicitly, for nearly every facet
of our daily lives. It supports other critical infrastructure sectors and U.S. national security.
U.S. adversaries have recognized the importance of the financial system to U.S. power for
decades and seek to leverage U.S. infrastructure vulnerabilities to overcome our advantages
in traditional warfare. When adversaries specifically leverage vulnerabilities in the financial
system, they engage in financial warfare. We define financial warfare as an attack that targets
either money, which is any store of value that can be exchanged between two parties; players,
who engage in financial transactions; or operators, who facilitate financial transactions.
Financial warfare attacks are occurring more frequently at a time when several trends, such
as shifting demographics and increasing levels of U.S. debt, are likely either to continue
encouraging those attacks or amplify the damage from them. Many organizations, including
the Federal Reserve, Department of the Treasury, Office of Financial Research, and others,
have devoted significant efforts to understanding vulnerabilities in the financial system. We
employ a different approach for identifying vulnerabilities which builds upon previouswork:
creating a network of the financial system, which provides us with a different perspective
on potential vulnerabilities.
We begin to create the network by first establishing a set of criteria for its underlying data.
The data must be comprehensive, in that they cover the most significant monies, players,
and operators; manageable, in that they balance granularity with the ability to aggregate
the data; reliable, in that they come from a trusted organization; regular, in that they are
published with enough frequency to allow for timely network creation and analysis; and
confirmable, in that data from multiple sources largely agree. We identify several sources
which meet most or all of these criteria, such as the Federal Reserve, Bank for International
Settlements, and Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association. We focus the
efforts of this thesis on the Federal Reserve Bank Flow of Funds (FFoF) to lay a foundation
that will be built upon by future work.
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We specifically focus on end-of-quarter sector holding amounts of each money tracked in
the FFoF. We develop computational tools to import and clean the overall quarterly FFoF
report and holding amounts for the current and historical quarters. Our curated data is a
critical end-product; we use it to create a network representation of the financial system
and then analyze the network to identify the most important monies and players based on
rankings, analysis of network structure, and visualizations of different dimensions of the
network, including temporal changes between network iterations.
Using a point-in-time approach, we observe the same monies and sectors appear in different
elements of our analysis and visualizations. These monies and sectors are either highly
connected in the network, represent a concentration of capital, or both. Highly connected
monies and sectors are vulnerable due to the possibility that damage from an attack, such
as instigating an intentional crisis of confidence, can affect a large number of other monies
or sectors. Examples we observe include the Non-Financial Corporate Business and Non-
Financial Non-Corporate Business sectors and the Corporate and Foreign Bonds money.
Monies and sectors with a high concentration of capital are vulnerable because of the
potential for a high dollar reward (from an attacker’s perspective) and because they may
represent relatively few points of failure. Examples we observe include the Private Pension
Funds andState andLocalGovernment EmployeeDefinedBenefitRetirement Funds sectors.
The sector Households and Non-Profit Organizations is an example of a sector that is
both highly connected and has a large concentration of capital. Sectors such as this are
systemically important.
We are able to identify different vulnerabilities by observing changes in the financial system
over time, rather than relying on a single point-in-time. For example, we identify the
Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) sector as a potential vulnerability due to its
increased importance to the Home Mortgages money, and the Loans market generally,
from Q4 2008 to Q3 2019. We note that GSEs did not appear in any of the point-in-time
visualizations or analyses as an important node.
Our work is limited in several ways. Although the financial system is global in nature, our
work considers only the U.S. financial system. Therefore, we are unable to determine the
ramifications that the failure of a component of the global financial system would have on
xvi
the U.S. financial system. In addition, there are a number of activities for which it is not
possible to obtain data, including financial transactions carried out via cryptocurrencies, via
so-called “dark pools,” which are owned by financial institutions and which allow investors
to engage in financial transactions privately; and via criminal activity. These and other
enterprises likely account for significant financial transactions that cannot be captured by
the techniques described in this thesis. Finally, the network we create focuses on monies
and players; it does not include operators. Operators are critical to the stable functioning of
the financial system. As such, they represent another possible avenue for financial warfare
attacks.
Our reliance on the FFoF data creates other limitations. Although the FFoF contains data
on many significant monies and players, there are several it does not, especially derivatives.
As such, our network cannot capture the impact of those missing monies and players. Also,
the FFoF is published only quarterly. In some instances, this is too infrequent to allow
timely analysis. For example, during the 2008 financial crisis, the failure of key financial
institutions and the crisis of confidence that precipitated a drop in the prices of certain
monies unfolded over approximately two weeks. Furthermore, the tables in the FFoF do
not have the granularity to determine which sectors are directly connected to one another
and must use their connections via mutual monies as a proxy.
All of these limitations could be addressed in future work by incorporating additional FFoF
data and/or additional data sources.
Our network analysis is oriented only from a defensive perspective of the U.S. financial
system. Future work has the potential to gain different insights by taking an offensive
approach towards the U.S. financial system.
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Modern warfare increasingly involves actions other than conventional attacks carried out
with kinetic weapons between two or more state actors. The growth in terrorist activity by
non-state actors over the last two decades has dominated discussions of national security,
but the use of unconventional tactics and even attacks by state actors are recently on the rise.
This blend of traditional and non-traditional attacks has become known as hybrid warfare.
1.1 Hybrid Warfare Defined
The term hybrid warfare is meant to reflect the changing nature of warfare, but it is often
criticized as “lacking a clear definition” (Hartmann 2017) due to varying definitions given
by different groups. Hartmann (2017) defines hybrid warfare as
a creative combination of civil and military ways and means that are deployed 
in a synchronized manner. The political aim of state or non-state actors that 
conduct hybrid warfare is to preserve or create non-democratic regimes and 
increase strategic options to enhance their power in international relations.
Lasconjarias and Larsen (2015a) define hybrid warfare slightly differently as
the true combination and blending of various means of conflict, both regular 
and unconventional, dominating the physical and psychological battlefield with 
information and media control, using every possible means to reduce one’s 
exposure. This may include the necessity of deploying hard military power, 
with the goal of breaking an opponent’s will and eliminating the population’s 
support for its legal authorities.
These are two of many definitions of hybrid warfare. For the purposes of this thesis, we use
the definition given by Lasconjarias and Larsen while also acknowledging the importance
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of Hartmann’s emphasis on the ability of both state and non-state actors to wage hybrid
warfare.
Russia’s invasion of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 is a prominent and ongoing case study of
hybrid warfare (see, for example, the collected volume of essays in Lasconjarias and Larsen
2015b). Before and after the invasion, Russia utilized social media to spread disinformation
and foment discontent with the Ukrainian government in the eastern part of the country.
For example, Russia’s efforts on Facebook were so pervasive that in 2015, then-Ukrainian
President Petro Poroshenko called directly on Facebook Chief Executive Officer Mark
Zuckerberg to assist Ukraine in fighting Russia’s disinformation campaign (Priest et al.
2018). Russian-backed separatists had a more insidious use of Facebook to target (literally)
the Ukrainian military. Separatists used Facebook to identify and contact the families of
Ukrainian military personnel to tell them their sons or daughters had been killed. Many of
those families then called their loved ones to confirm what they had been told. Separatists
used the resulting increases in cell phone activity in certain areas to train their artillery fire
(Brown 2018). In addition, Russia attacked Ukraine’s electrical grid, thereby undermining
Ukraine’s ability to fight back (Cain 2019). Attacks on critical infrastructure — such as
the transportation, water, financial, communication, or power systems, among others — are
classic examples of hybrid warfare.
1.2 Hybrid Warfare and U.S. Critical Infrastructure
There is growing evidence of hybrid warfare being conducted at home within the U.S. For
example, media outlets have increasingly reported over the last several years about malware
implanted via cyberattacks in the systems of American power and water plants (Sanger
and Perlroth 2019). These reports echo warnings from the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), which is responsible for the protection of most U.S. infrastructure, of
threats to that infrastructure.
DHS now designates 16 sectors as critical infrastructure, which the agency defines as
sectors whose assets, systems, and networks, whether physical or virtual, are 
considered so vital to the United States that their incapacitation or destruction 
would have a debilitating effect on security, national economic security, national
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public health or safety, or any combination thereof. (Department of Homeland 
Security 2019)
Most of these sectors, such as agriculture, water, and energy, have been heavily studied to
protect them from attacks. One sector, however, has received relatively less scrutiny from a
national security perspective, despite being the only one which underpins every other sector
and which is the beating heart of U.S. power: the financial system.
1.3 The U.S. Financial System
The U.S. economy is currently the largest in the world in absolute terms from many per-
spectives. Nominal U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) stood at $22.3 trillion as of October
2019, approximately 50% larger than China’s, the world’s second largest economy (Inter-
national Monetary Fund 2019a). Financial system companies comprised more than 8%
of U.S. GDP, ranking third of the 22 industries tracked by the Federal Reserve (Federal
Reserve Economic Data 2019). In the second quarter of 2019, U.S. debt from all levels
of government, businesses, and households and non-profits totaled more than $77 trillion,
more than three and a half times U.S. GDP (Windenberger 2019).
Still, the sizes of the U.S. economy and its financial system do not fully reflect their
importance. It is far more important to recognize that no other sector can operate without
money or the means to use it. Both are provided by the financial system, which is partly
illustrated by the fact that 80% of all capital in the U.S. is raised in financial markets.
In just the stock and bond portions of those markets, turnover (i.e., how often financial
instruments like stocks and bonds are bought and sold) annualized to nearly $307 trillion in
2019 as calculated from Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA)
statistics (Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association Statistics 2019a,b; Swing
Trade Systems Trading Days Calendar 2020), a value nearly 14 times larger than U.S. GDP.
Furthermore, the U.S. dollar is the world’s most widely used reserve currency. It comprised
nearly 62% of all global foreign exchange reserves as of the second quarter of 2019, more
than three times the share of the euro, theworld’s next leading reserve currency (International
Monetary Fund Data 2019). The dollar’s status as the world’s premier reserve currency
largely allows the U.S. to avoid exchange rate risk and reduces borrowing costs.
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Changes to the financial system therefore affect every aspect of the U.S. economy in some 
way. For example, “chasing yield,” a prominent activity that led some investors to buy the 
type of mortgage monies that contributed to the 2008 financial crisis, manifested itself via 
different investors and other monies in 2008 and still in others today. The integral nature 
of the financial system, its dynamic behavior, and U.S. advantages in conventional warfare 
make the U.S. a prime target for the reemergence and evolution of a particular type of hybrid 
warfare: financial warfare.
1.4 Financial Warfare Defined
The importance of the financial system to U.S. power has not gone unnoticed by potential 
adversaries. In 1999, Colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui of China’s People’s Liber-
ation Army of China (PLA) published a book titled Unrestricted Warfare, in which they 
argued that non-military actions would be necessary to overcome advantages held by the 
U.S. military. Their observations pertinent to the financial system include the following:
Financial war is a form of non-military warfare which is just as terribly 
destructive as a bloody war. . . [though] no blood is actually shed. Financial 
warfare has now officially come to war’s center stage. (Liang and Xiangsui 
1999)
The authors further assert that man-made stock market crashes, attacks on financial in-
struments, and cyber attacks on the financial system would be central features of modern
warfare. To understand what constitutes financial warfare, we first define three broad
categories which characterize all financial systems.
Money comprises the first category, which is much more broad than its typical colloquial
usage suggests. Here, we definemoney to mean a store of value via any financial instrument
or physical or digital asset which can be bought, sold, or otherwise exchanged between two or
more parties. Common examples include physical or digital currencies (what is commonly
thought of when referring to money), stocks (shares of ownership in a company), bonds
(debt contracts of companies and governments which yield interest to the bond owner), or
precious metals, such as gold. Unless otherwise noted, any later use of the word money in
this thesis uses this definition.
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Players comprise the second category of the financial system and are the active participants
in a financial system who engage in a financial transaction. Such transactions can include
buying, selling, and trading monies or entering into the contracts upon which those monies
are predicated. Examples of players include individuals, who might take out a mortgage or
buy and sell stocks for their retirement portfolios; multinational banks who lend the money
for those mortgages or provide financial services for other firms; the U.S. Treasury and other
municipalities, which finance government activities by selling bonds; the Federal Reserve,
which engages in a number of market activities; various types of funds, which pool capital
and invest on behalf of shareholders; insurance companies, which provide money in the
form of risk management tools; and many others.
Operators comprise the third and final category of the financial system. In contrast to
players, operators do not actively engage in financial transactions; instead, they facilitate
their execution. Operators are, in effect, the “plumbing” of the financial system. Examples
of operators include automated clearing houses (ACHs), which handle payment processing
and securities and derivatives transactions; the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial
Telecommunication (SWIFT), which is the only firm in the world that provides a global
network to financial institutions to communicate about their financial transactions; stock,
bond, and derivatives exchanges such as the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), which
provide a platform for buying and selling those monies; depository, trust, and record-
keeping activities such as the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC), which
maintains secure transaction records; Fedwire, which assists in settling transactions; and
new fintech payment platforms that increasingly provide non-traditional ways of transferring
money.
With these concepts in hand, we now define financial warfare to be any type of attack which
targets money, players, and/or operators in the financial system. Attacks can be physical,
cyber, or financial and therefore can manifest in several ways. First, an attack on money
could be intended to undermine its value, trust in the money itself, or both. Second, attacks
on players or operators could interdict and/or hijack their operations. Interdiction prevents
them from operating at all, while hijacking uses their operations in a manner in which
they were not intended to be used. The damage from either interdiction or hijacking can
also undermine the credibility of players or operators and by extension, trust in the entire
financial system.
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Financial attacks may be precise or widespread. However, even if an attack targets only a
fewmonies, players, or operators, it is important to remember that the interconnected nature
of the financial system can allow the effects of such attacks to ripple out to other parts of
the financial system and the economy. As such, components and industries far removed
from an attack’s original targets may also suffer damage. Examples of damage indirectly
affecting sectors include George Soros’ attack on the pound sterling (Kuepper 2020), the
Asian currency crisis that caused substantial losses in the U.S. (Carson and Clark 2013),
and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)’s purported financial attack on Qatar (Zhdannikov
2018).
1.5 Protecting the U.S. Financial System
Both the National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Defense Strategy (NDS) acknowl-
edge the importance of the economy to U.S. national security. However, this recognition
is largely discussed in the context of unfair market competition (e.g., subsidies or forced
technology transfers). The discussions in these documents entail economic warfare, which
Shambaugh (2019) defines as
the use of, or the threat to use, economic means against a country in order to 
weaken its economy and thereby reduce its political and military power. Eco-
nomic warfare also includes the use of economic means to compel an adversary 
to change its policies or behaviour or to undermine its ability to conduct normal 
relations with other countries. Some common means of economic warfare 
are trade embargoes, boycotts, sanctions, tariff discrimination, the freezing of 
capital assets, the suspension of aid, the prohibition of investment and other 
capital flows, and expropriation.
The end goal of both economic and financial warfare is the same, in that they aim to weaken
an adversary’s political and military power. There are some distinctions between both forms
of warfare, such as in their focus and scope (e.g., financial warfare is generally precise and
targets the financial system). However, the line between economic and financial warfare is
increasingly blurred. For example, sanctions are often thought of as a form of economic
warfare that targets broad sectors of an economy. However, the administrations of President
6
Trump and former President Obama implemented precise sanctions to isolate the targets
from the global financial system (e.g., against Iran, associates of Russian President Vladimir
Putin). The successes of these and similar activities demonstrate why detailed financial
maps are a critical defensive or offensive component of hybrid warfare. Furthermore, such
maps might assist in identifying illicit financial activity, which would support work done
by organizations such as the U.S. Treasury.
The current U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, Steven Mnuchin, noted on 18 May 2017,
I’m probably spending 50% of my time on TFI [Terrorism and Financial 
Intelligence] issues. It is, I think, perhaps the most important issue, right now, 
as part of my job. (Mnuchin 2017)
As Secretary Mnuchin’s comments imply, threats to the financial system are ongoing and
require substantial resources to address those threats. The financial system is critical to the
U.S. economy and U.S. national power, and it is important for organizations such as the
Department ofDefense (DoD) to devote additional resources to augment the efforts currently
beingmade by organizations such as the U.S. Treasury, Federal Reserve, Homeland Security
and Office of Financial Research (OFR).
The U.S. financial system’s importance to American life and its attractiveness as a target
for adversaries demand that it must be protected from harm. While protecting the financial
system can take many different forms, any protective measure depends upon knowledge of
the system’s activities, weaknesses, and the implications of component failures. Moreover,
the rapidly changing nature of the financial system (e.g., the introduction of new payment
systems, crypto-currencies, and blockchain, which provides security but also prevents
tracking bad actors) means protective measures may also have to change. Therefore,
protecting the financial system ultimately requires a thorough understanding of the system’s
structure and a means of rapidly updating the view of that structure.
The financial system can be represented as a network with the right framing, and a network
representation can be useful in several ways. First, a visualization of the network often
reveals key structural characteristics. For example, a visualization of the financial system as
a network can show sectors reliant upon a small number of components (i.e., money, players,
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or operators) and possible indirect effects of component failures. Once vulnerabilities are
identified, appropriate protective measures can be proposed, such as expanding the number
of components or otherwise filling their roles should they fail in some way.
Second, the financial system is transient by nature, and therefore, any network of the
financial system will necessarily change over time. Tracking changes in network structure
as new data become available allows one to identify, for example, the introduction or exit
of components or abnormal activity in the market. If new players or money were to emerge
and grow quickly, whether in terms of capital, trading volume, or both, this could signal a
new point of vulnerability in the markets which could place many sectors at risk.
1.6 Goals of this Thesis
This thesis builds a network representation of the U.S. financial system using data that is
processed automatically from the U.S. Federal Reserve. We analyze the network to identify
the most important monies and players based on rankings, analysis of network structure, and
visualizations of different dimensions of the network. By studying this network structure,
we obtain insight into potential vulnerabilities and changes in the financial system over time.
There are four primary goals of this work.
First, it should raise awareness of the network approach to modeling the financial system.
As previously noted, a map encompassing as great a view of the financial system as possible
that can also be produced quickly represents a protective approach that differs in key ways
from current publicly available research. Furthermore, if this thesis is capable of creating a
network of the U.S. financial system from publicly available data from which vulnerabilities
can be ascertained, it is a reasonable and cautious assumption that U.S. adversaries possess
this same capability. Therefore, it is imperative that senior decision makers are aware of the
potential benefits (from a defensive perspective) and hazards (from an adversary’s offensive
perspective) of a network model of the financial system. Such a network would also assist
in overcoming some of the information challenges associated with certain forms of analysis,
such as wargaming.
Second, the visualization of the network must be sufficiently intuitive that it allows for
qualitative conclusions to be drawn quickly. These initial insights can then be investigated
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further via network analysis, which can also reveal vulnerabilities that are not immediately
apparent from the network’s visualization.
Third, building the network and its visualization must be able to be completed quickly
enough so that new iterations of the network can be generated in near real-time as new data
become available. This allows a user to analyze notable changes quickly, such as anomalous
trading behavior or potentially dangerous build-ups of money in different sectors.
Finally, this thesis should lay the groundwork for creating networks of other countries’
financial systems. For this work, we adopt a defensive approach to the U.S. financial system.
Provided data are available, the approach utilized herein should be sufficiently adaptable to
create networks of other countries’ financial systems as well, for either offensive or defensive
purposes.
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We begin by describing recent examples of financial warfare. We then briefly discuss some
key structural elements of the financial system to contextualize how players and operators
interact to aid in understanding how we might identify vulnerabilities. Next, we review
some prior attempts at mapping the financial system and the shortcomings we later address
with our approach. We end by describing how a network map might be used and the tools
we employ for qualitatively and quantitatively analyzing it.
2.1 Examples of Financial Warfare
Imagine a person walking up to an ATM to withdraw cash or going online to pay bills, only
to find they cannot access their accounts or that they were not receiving their paycheck. This
is not merely hypothetical — customers of some of the country’s biggest banks, including
Bank of America, BB&T, and Wells Fargo, were affected by outages in 2017, 2018, and
2019, respectively, lasting from a few hours to a few days (Herrera 2017; Rexrode 2018;
Kunthara and Russell 2019). In one especially egregious example, TSB Bank in the UK
was hit by an outage that lasted more than a month for some customers (Rumney 2018). In
February 2020, Fidelity customers woke up to find that their account balances had gone to
$0; some of those customers were unable to access their accounts at all (Malito 2020).
Each of these outages were technical glitches, but malicious attacks have been occurring for
years and could causemuch greater damage. Russia decreased its holdings ofU.S. Treasuries
by 84% in a three month period in early 2018, in part due to U.S. sanctions on some
Russian individuals and businesses (Egan 2018). In early 2019, China reportedly considered
reducing its holdings of U.S. Treasuries as a result of the ongoing tariff disputes with the
U.S. (Gibson 2019). Similarly, Former Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson stated in a
2014 interview that, in 2008, Russia encouraged China to dump its holdings of mortgage-
backed securities issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac on the global market, an attack on
a money and players which could have inflicted significant damage on the mortgage market
at a time it was already suffering (Peston 2014). A similar vulnerability may be building up
again, as U.S. home prices exceeded pre-financial crisis levels in late 2016 (Orton 2016) and
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have continued climbing since, which increases the leveraged positions of new homeowners
in the mortgage market.
In 2010, hackers (who were suspected to be Russian) penetrated the NASDAQ exchange
and stole much of its source code, with the speculated aim of helping to establish Moscow
as a financial hub. The subsequent investigation into the attack found the hack could
have instead disrupted the NASDAQ’s operations, constituting interdiction of a player and
operator (Riley 2014). In 2016, hackers hijacked the SWIFT account of the central bank
of Bangladesh and used the network to place nearly $1 billion in false orders, of which
more than $81 million were executed and never recovered (Schwartz 2016). This is one of
several recent and successful hacks of SWIFT’s network, which are hijacking attacks that
also undermined trust in SWIFT’s operations.
In recent years, hackers and gangs have stolen money directly from users (e.g., those of
Sberbank, Russia’s largest bank; see Townsend 2016) or from multiple banks directly
(e.g., the Carbanak cybergang, which stole up to $1 billion from as many as 100 different
institutions; see SecureList 2015). These examples illustrate the importance of identifying
nodes (e.g., players and operators) who have high possible reward per attack; large nodes
who present relative ease of attack; or nodes which offer the opportunity for repeated
attacks; monies that lack traceability; and more. Network mapping is designed to promote
the identification of such vulnerabilities.
2.2 Financial Warfare Is Longstanding and Ongoing
Financial warfare provides opportunities for many types of actions by an attacker: direct or
indirect, misattributable or unattributable. Examples begin just after the post-war period
and have become more prevalent in recent years. Here, we discuss examples of attacks on
money, players, and operators in turn.
Attacks on Money
An early prominent example of financial warfare in the post-war period occurred during
the Suez Crisis. In 1956, the U.S. and U.K. withdrew promises to finance construction of
the Aswan Dam. In July the same year, Egyptian President Gamal Nasser responded by
nationalizing the Suez Canal Company, which had previously been owned and operated by
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the British and the French. In October, the British and the French planned and executed an
invasion of Egypt with the Israelis to retake the Suez Canal. American leadership under
President Eisenhower opposed military intervention in Egypt, in part due to American
opposition to similar intervention by the Soviets in Hungary occurring at the same time.
President Eisenhower was upset with the British for not keeping him apprised of their
intentions. He first attempted to use diplomacy to get the British to back down. He
did not want to respond militarily against an ally when they refused, so he used several
financial strikes instead. First, he prevented the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
the Import-Export Bank (IEB) from extending credit to the U.K., whose economy was
still recovering after World War II and dependent upon financing for much of its imports.
Second, he threatened to dump all U.S. bond holdings of the pound sterling on the world
market. Without external financing and with its currency under threat of devaluation, the
British were forced to withdraw from Egypt less than a week after their troops had entered
the country (Department of State Office of the Historian 2019; McMaken 2015).
Although President Eisenhower did not follow through with financial strikes against the
U.K., the Suez Crisis illustrates two examples of attacks threatened against financial instru-
ments. The first was withholding credit to the U.K. Given the state of the British economy
at the time, this was an indirect strike against the pound sterling. The British were still
recovering fromWorld War II and relied on deficit spending to purchase critical goods from
abroad, such as food and fuel. A lack of credit would have undermined the British economy
and in turn devalued the currency, making these goods more expensive for the British and
severely limiting their ability to import them.
Dumping pound sterling bonds on the world market would have constituted a direct strike
against that money. On its own, dumping would require the U.K. to pay a higher coupon,
or interest rate, to entice investors into buying newly issued debt instead of the increased
supply of existing bonds in the world market. The impact of dumping would have been
more pronounced due to the restriction of credit from the IMF and the IEB. Given that
restricting credit could devalue the pound sterling, any pound-denominated bonds would
carry greater currency risk because the pound would be likely to lose value relative to other
currencies. The restriction of credit, currency risk associated with the pound sterling, and
increased supply of pound sterling bonds could have frozen the British out of global credit
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markets and prevented their ability to trade internationally.
Attacks on Players
The NASDAQ is an American stock exchange based in NewYork City, one of several owned
by the financial services company of the same name. At the end of 2018, it was the world’s
second-largest stock exchange as measured by the market capitalization of the companies
it lists, which is approximately 20% of total global market capitalization (Shukla 2019). In
2018, the value of the trading volume on the NASDAQ was greater than that of the next five
largest stock exchanges combined (Statista 2018).
In October 2010, malware was discovered in the NASDAQ’s servers. The hackers who
planted the malware did so by leveraging so-called “zero-day exploits”, which are vulner-
abilities that either have not been discovered or have not been patched by the software’s
creator. It was initially believed the malware was capable of disrupting the NASDAQ’s op-
erations, and the investigation into the attack involved the National Security Agency (NSA),
CIA, FBI, DoD, DHS, and Department of the Treasury (DoT). The investigation ultimately
concluded that the attack was most likely perpetrated by Russian hackers attempting to
steal the exchange’s source code, possibly with the intent of establishing an exchange in
Moscow. Although it also determined the malware was not capable of as much disruption
as initially believed, the networks of several other major financial institutions were found
to be vulnerable to the same zero-day exploits that enabled the hackers to penetrate the
NASDAQ’s servers (Riley 2014).
In June 2010, the United Nations (UN) passed sanctions against Iran in an effort to cur-
tail its nuclear program, which were followed by additional sanctions from the U.S. and
European Union (EU). The U.S. sanctions indirectly targeted the Iranian government by
directly targeting two broad categories: firms involved in Iran’s oil sector and foreign banks
conducting business with Iranian banks (Sen 2018).
At that time, oil comprised nearly one-fifth of Iranian GDP (TheGlobalEconomy.com
2019). When U.S. sanctions went into effect, many insurers ceased underwriting policies
for Iranian shippers. The sanctions against foreign banks had two effects. First, Iran was
unable to access much of its assets stored abroad. Second, many banks would not process
transactions for Iranian oil. Since most ports will not allow entry to cargo ships if they
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are uninsured and many banks would not facilitate the sale of Iranian oil, its ability to
sell oil internationally was severely curtailed (Erdbrink and Lynch 2010; Saul and Cohn
2019). Before sanctions were lifted in 2015 as part of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action (JCPOA), more commonly known as the Iran nuclear deal, Iran’s oil exports fell by
more than half (Katzman 2019).
The U.S. targeted Iran again recently. In September 2019, the U.S. imposed sanctions
against Iran’s central bank. The sanctions effectively cut off Iran (a player) from the world’s
financial markets (Talley and Ballhaus 2019).
Attacks on Operators
SWIFT, an organization located in Belgium run by many of the world’s largest central
banks, provides a secure communications network to more than 11,000 financial institutions
worldwide. Institutions primarily use the network to transfer money by placing orders with
other institutions, which use the network to validate those orders (Zetter 2016).
In February 2016, a group of hackers gained access to the network of the central bank
of Bangladesh to gain access to its SWIFT account. The hackers used the account to
place fraudulent orders with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY), requesting a
transfer of the bank of Bangladesh’s funds to various banks throughout Asia. The fraudulent
orders totaled nearly $1 billion. Of those orders, $101 million were executed; one bank was
able to reverse a $20 million transfer, but the remaining $81 million was stolen and never
recovered. The hackers’ efforts to conceal their actions were largely successful and might
have stolen significantly more money. However, a typographical error alerted an employee
at the FRBNY and caused the employee to scrutinize the orders more closely. Other orders
were not executed immediately only because the name of a bank to which funds were to be
routed contained part of the name of an unrelated company which had been blacklisted for
violating sanctions on Iran (Zetter 2016).
This attack is not isolated. Since 2015, at least six other attacks have hijacked the SWIFT
accounts of different financial institutions. The attacks attempted to steal or have success-
fully stolen approximately $42million (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2017).
Although SWIFT’s network was not directly compromised, the attacks have been extremely
financially costly to the institutions which use it. Furthermore, the attacks raise questions
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about whether there are sufficient safeguards in place to prevent the execution of fraudulent
orders, which undermines trust in SWIFT itself.
2.3 Today’s Financial Vulnerabilities
The preceding examples illustrate that the financial system is vulnerable in a multitude of
ways. The goals of an attacker can be financial (e.g., stealing monies, making a profit on
manipulatedmarkets, illicitmovement ofmonies, avoiding taxes) or systemic (e.g., disabling
critical financial system plumbing or infrastructure, creating a crisis of confidence in one or
more players or monies, or destroying confidence in a player, money, or even a nation state).
Making sense of financial warfare today requires understanding three important points.
First, financial warfare attacks are occurring more frequently in the cyber domain, due
to increasing use of the cloud and the Internet of Things (IoT), digitization, and changes
in consumer and business behavior to embrace these changes. Hackers successfully used
Trojan malware to steal hundreds of millions of euros from German bank customers by
disguising bank withdrawals via the display of unchanged online bank balances (Harris
2009). Further, small groups of actors are able to have an outsized effect, such as the London
Whale, who lost $6.2 billion for JPMorgan Chase (Hurtado 2016), or Navinder Sarao, who
caused the 2010 Flash Crash of major U.S. stock markets that initially eliminated more than
$1 trillion in equity value (Kenton 2019b). It is important to note bad actors who do not
have the resources to mount traditional warfare attacks are able to execute financial warfare
attacks. As such, these actors’ ability to influence the financial system is one of many
reasons a full view of it is necessary to determine its vulnerabilities.
Second, while digitization has increased the frequency with which the financial system is
attacked, cyber warfare is not the only way by which to conduct financial warfare. The
2010 sanctions against Iran provide one such example; Russia’s urging of China to dump
U.S. mortgage-backed bonds is another (Peston 2014). Therefore, it is important not to
take a parochial view of financial warfare by considering it only as a subcategory of cyber
warfare.
Finally, financial warfare attacks on either money, players, or operators often impact one
of the other categories. During the Suez crisis and with sanctions on Iran, players were
indirectly targeted (the U.K. or Iran) by directly targeting money (bonds and credit or
16
insurance and banking access). The hacks of banks’ SWIFT accounts directly damaged
players (the banks themselves) and indirectly impacted an operator (SWIFT, by undermining
trust in its operations). The indirect effects of direct attacks help to demonstrate the
connections between money, players, and operators and thus why a network is ideally suited
to represent the financial system.
Moreover, the interconnectivity and overall complexity of the financial system means that
it does not require an intelligent adversary for there to be widespread disruption, as noted
by the 2008 global financial crisis. Analyses of the causes of the crisis point to exposure
to subprime mortgages, which in the U.S. grew from an estimated 15% of all mortgage
originations in 2001 to 48% of all originations by 2006 (Baily et al. 2008). Debt monies
whose values were predicated on pools of mortgages (one form of a derivative) also grew
significantly in size and value during this time. Several large financial institutions, including
Lehman Brothers, used this form of money as collateral to obtain short-term loans for their
day-to-day operations. Two of the largest players (JPMorgan Chase and the Bank of New
York Mellon) who accepted this money as collateral severely curtailed their lending based
on this collateral to highly leveraged players. As some of these players lost access to critical
sources of funding, they either failed or required bailouts. The subsequent system-wide
credit freeze affected sectors which still operated using day-to-day financing predicated on
other forms of collateral but which had no exposure to the mortgage market.
The bottom line is that you cannot build financial system resilience if you cannot “see”
its vulnerabilities. Analyzing the system in a manner that captures the complexities of the
preceding example requires a specific view of the financial system. Fortunately, substantial
and important work has been done by many organizations to attempt to generate such a
view of the financial system,
2.4 Prior Mapping Attempts




Several organizations have generated some form of map of the financial system, including
heat maps. Heat maps have some conceptual similarities to a network approach, in that
they generally can be produced quickly (if constructed appropriately) and visualize data
to highlight areas of potential concern. Prior mapping efforts provide important insights.
However, the approach we employ differs in key ways, which we describe.
The IMF produces a heat map (pictured in Figure 2.1) they publish for public review, which
is meant to give some insight into global financial stressors. The IMF’s heat map is global
in scope; while it does include the U.S., its focus is not U.S.-specific (as might be expected
of a worldwide institution) (McLaughlin et al. 2018). The IMF’s heat map flags areas of
potential vulnerability by focusing on major economic areas. Our approach differs from the
IMF’s heat map in that we focus specifically on the U.S. and create a network to identify
vulnerabilities (in terms of monies, players, or operators) instead of economic areas.
The Federal Reserve also generates a heat map, which focuses on the U.S. financial system.
Their heat map is not released to the public (McLaughlin et al. 2018). However, Aikman
et al. (2015) discuss how the heat map is constructed. The Federal Reserve uses 44 different
indicators to build their map; the indicators are similar to those used by the OFR’s financial
stress index (FSI) and are chosen after reviewing existing literature (Aikman et al. 2015). As
noted previously, the FSI’s U.S.-specific indicators do not overlap with the money, players,
or operators used in this thesis, which is largely true of those used by the Federal Reserve
as well.
In addition to the FSI, the OFR currently publishes the financial system vulnerabilities
monitor (FSVM), which replaced the financial stability monitor (FSM) (Office of Financial
Research 2019) in 2017. The FSVM is also a heat map (pictured in Figure 2.2); it is
predicated on 58 indicators. Aswith the IMF and Federal Reserve’s heatmaps, the indicators
differ from the network approach we employ, in that they flag potential vulnerabilities by
economic areas by estimating risk.
The manner in which indicators are selected to build the Federal Reserve’s and OFR’s heat
maps implies another important distinction with a network approach. As Aikman et al.
(2015) note,
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With those heat maps, the first step is to select indicators from a review of prior work,
followed by building the heat map. In our approach, we use raw data first to build the
network and then analyze it for potential vulnerabilities (from which indicators may be
selected).
19
Figure 2.1. IMF’s heat map. The map focuses on major economic areas and 
flags areas of potential vulnerability. Source: International Monetary Fund 
(2019b).
Indicator selection began with a broad review of studies of financial stability
vulnerabilities, including empirical studies and monitoring frameworks used
by others in the official sector.
Figure 2.2. OFR’s FSVM heat map. As with the IMF’s heat map, the
FSVM flags potential vulnerabilities by economic areas. Note the FSVM is
U.S.-specific. Source: Office of Financial Research (2020).
2.4.2 Network Maps
Two organizations have generated networks akin to the one we seek in this thesis.
In early 2019, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) published the Global Monitoring Report
on Non-Bank Financial Intermediation. Chen (2019) characterizes a non-bank financial
intermediary (NBFI)’s activities in the following way:
A non-bank financial intermediary does not accept deposits from the general 
public. The intermediary may provide factoring, leasing, insurance plans or 
other financial services. Many intermediaries take part in securities exchanges 
and utilize long-term plans for managing and growing their funds.
While the FSB’s report focuses on a limited number of institutions amongst those in the
financial system, its illustration of interconnectedness helps to illustrate the network concept
we use, as shown in Figure 2.3 below.
The FSB’s diagram includes several characteristics we capture in our network. First, players
(as aggregate sectors) form the nodes (the squares in Figure 2.3), which are sized according
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to the player’s asset total relative to the sum of all assets for all players. Second, players are 
linked via money (the arrows in Figure 2.3); the arrow’s direction indicates “flow,” or 
investment from a lender in a borrower, from a lender (at the arrow’s tail) to a borrower 
(at the arrow’s head). While the thickness of an arrow is conceptually similar to the size 
of a node, it differs from a node’s sizing in that an arrow’s thickness is determined by the 
absolute size of the exposure, not the size relative to the sum of all exposures (Financial 
Stability Board 2019). Both a node’s size and an arrow’s thickness give immediate visual 
indications of a player and money’s importance, respectively.
Figure 2.3. FSB’s network representation. Squares are primary nodes rep-
resenting players. The nodes are connected directly with arcs directed from
asset- to liability-holders. The arcs are sized according to the size of the
claims one node has on another. Nodes are sized according to their overall
holdings. Source: Financial Stability Board (2019).
We add to the FSB’s approach in two ways: we expand the network by adding more players
21
(nodes) and addingmoremonies (arcs). In doing so, we gain further insight into connections
between players (with the inclusion of moremonies as arcs) and a larger view of the financial
system (with the inclusion of both more monies and more players).
The other institution to develop amap of the financial system is SBCCGroup. SBCC created
their map in 2014, predating the one created by the FSB. SBCC’s map is reproduced in
Figure 2.4, with permission fromTanyaBeder, Chairman andChief ExecutiveOfficer (CEO)
of SBCC Group.
SBCC’s map captures the same node characteristics as the FSB’s map. In comparing
Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.4, however, nodes are presented differently in the SBCC map; the
two columns comprising each node (player) represent that player’s assets (on the left) and
liabilities (on the right). The constituent blocks of a column represent a form of money and
are sized relative to the sum of that column (i.e., that player’s assets or liabilities). SBCC’s
map also adds to the FSB map by incorporating more monies and players.
We build upon SBCC’s map in several ways. First, the Federal Reserve currently releases
files that accompany the Portable Document Format (PDF) release of the Federal Reserve
Bank Flow of Funds (FFoF) which contain data which date back to 1945. When SBCC first
created their map, those accompanying files did not exist. SBCC used automation where
possible (e.g., PDF scrapers), but the lack of accompanying files limited this automation and
required significant manual work, which slowed the creation of their map. The automation
we implement combines historical and current data from the FFoF to create a large network
quickly. Second, we leverage one aspect of the FSB’s map, namely that arcs are sized
according to the size of the claim, to build upon the SBCC map. Finally, by creating a
network quickly, we create new visualizations as data become available to identify potential
new vulnerabilities as they arise.
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Figure 2.4. SBCC’s network representation. Players are primary nodes which 
are represented with side-by-side columns. The left and right columns are 
that player’s assets and liabilities, respectively. Each block within a column 
corresponds to a money. The block is sized according to the amount of that 
holding relative to the sum of all holdings. Arcs are directed from like-colored 
blocks from the asset columns of all players which own that money to an 
intermediate node representing the money corresponding to that block. Arcs 
are then directed from that intermediate node to the like-colored blocks in 
the liability columns of the players which owe that money. Source: SBCC 
Group (2014).
23
2.5 Using Maps for Vulnerability Analysis
There are several ways a map can be used to identify existing vulnerabilities or to identify
potential new vulnerabilities as they arise within the financial system.
With a map, we can identify major participants (either players or operators) in the financial
system. A major player is one which belongs to the group of players which collectively hold
at least 80% of the assets or liabilities of a given market. Similarly, a major operator is one
which belongs to the group of operators which facilitates at least 80% of money transfers
within a given market. Under this definition, we can identify participants which are one of
a few (or possibly single) points of failure. Major participants are more likely to be targets
given their systemic importance.
We can also use a map to identify major monies. Major monies necessarily include large
amounts of capital and often include a large number of participants. As such, an attack on
a major money can either have a significant impact on a small number of participants or a
relatively lesser impact on a large number of participants.
Wecan use amap to identify single points of failure. Amarketwith relatively fewparticipants
is necessarily concentrated; if one participant were to fail in such amarket, the risk is greater
that the remaining participants would not be able to fill the gap created by that participant’s
failure. For example, this occurred during the 2008 financial crisis. At the time, JPMorgan
Chase and the Bank of New York Mellon were the primary players providing short-term
financing backed by certain forms of collateral. An attack on either player would have also
been damaging to any players dependent on those short-term financing markets.
We can use a map to identify places of widespread impact. If a participant is connected
to many other participants, damage from an attack on that participant has greater potential
to spread to other participants. We can quickly identify highly connected participants by
counting the arcs emanating from or directed to the participants in a map. In counting
the arcs, we also consider the flows those arcs represent, which is the actual amount of a
given money invested or borrowed by a participant. This context is necessary because a
participant may be highly connected while many or all of its connections represent relatively
small amounts. An attack on such a participant would be less likely to cause damage that
spreads to other participants.
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We can identify new participants and monies that represent new potential vulnerabilities
as they arise between map iterations, as well as those which become less relevant or
disappear from the financial system entirely over time. For example, many players either
went bankrupt or were severely damaged during the 2008 financial crisis because of their
exposures to subprime mortgages, the market for which had grown significantly in the
years preceding the crisis. After the crisis, the number of subprime mortgage originations
dropped substantially.
We can use a map to gain different perspectives into different markets, especially with
respect to time. For example, mortgages can represent a connection between a lender and a
borrower that lasts for up to 30 years, while equities trading represents a connection between
the buyer and seller that lasts only a few days.
2.6 Contributions in Context
We now describe the contributions of the chapters to follow.
In Chapter 3, we present our overall workflow, with a focus on data curation. First, we
discuss the process by which we select a baseline data source. Second, we detail the
challenges we face in curating the data from our selected source and how we process the
data into a dataframe. Finally, we describe the characteristics of that dataframe, which we
use in to create our network.
In Chapter 4, we use our curated data to create a network representation of the U.S. financial
system. We analyze the connectivity structure of the network to identify key structural
features. We then comment on the implications of these features in terms of potential
vulnerabilities.
In Chapter 5, we describe how to use our data curation and modeling technique to identify
and understand changes in the financial system over time.
We conclude in Chapter 6 by discussing the results and insights gained from our models
and analysis. We then discuss the assumptions and limitations on our work. We finish by
proposing ideas for building upon our work in the future.
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CHAPTER 3:
Data Curation and Modeling
In this chapter, we describe the sources of data we use in this study, as well as the steps
we use to clean and curate the data into a form suitable for network analysis. Specifically,
we describe the criteria we use for selecting data sources, how we curate the data from
those sources, and the characteristics of the final dataset we produce. Figure 3.1 provides a
visualization of the overall data curation and analytical process.
Figure 3.1. The data curation, modeling and analysis, and visualization tasks
are in blue. The workflow for the network’s creation is in red. The input
and output files are in green. The tools used are in purple. Note the arrow
from the FFoF data indicates those data provide the network’s foundation
for this thesis.
3.1 Criteria in Choosing Data Sources
The following are the data characteristics we consider for selecting sources from which we
build our final dataset. For this thesis, we focus on the FFoF data. Note that, for future
work, more than one source can comprise the final dataset, with which we could generate
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networks with greater frequency (e.g., monthly or weekly), obtain different perspectives
(e.g., trading volumes), or expand the network further (e.g., adding derivatives).
• Comprehensive: The dataset must be broad and deep. It must cover the most
significant players, operators, and monies while providing some granularity on the
players’ activities (e.g., their trading volumes or outstanding assets and liabilities).
• Manageable: The dataset must balance the level of granularity and the ability to
aggregate data. That is, we desire as much granularity as possible, provided we can
aggregate the data in a way which allows us to focus on smaller parts of the network
as necessary to avoid creating an unwieldy network which inhibits identification of
market trends.
• Reliable: The data comprising the final dataset must be reliable (e.g., from a trusted
organization, such as the Federal Reserve). Any analysis is only as good as its
underlying data, so the data source must be trustworthy.
• Regular: The data must be published relatively frequently. Infrequently published
data do not permit analysis of market trends as they occur.
• Confirmable: Ideally, data are reconcilable between sources. Sources which confirm
each other’s data are more trustworthy than those which are not confirmable. It is
important to note that given this is real-world data, there are sometimes discrepancies
due to differences from the institutions reporting to the source in question. For
example, the FFoF includes line items specifically noting such discrepancies. That
said, the data sources must not be so far apart as to undermine the data’s validity.
There are several sources of initial interest because they meet several of the criteria outlined
above, including the Federal Reserve’s FFoF, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS)’
Statistics Warehouse, and SIFMA’s Research & Data. Each of these sources are valuable
because they cover a variety of players and monies to varying degrees of granularity. They
also provide differing perspectives, such as players’ overall holding levels of monies at a
given point in time or transaction volumes in a given period of time.
We also recognize there are some shortcomings with these sources (e.g., the FFoF does not
incorporate any detailed derivatives data and SIFMA often does not provide granularity for
all themonies in our analysis). Furthermore, each source generallymaintains its own format,
which we must be address when aggregating data. For example, the FFoF and SIFMA data
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cover many of the same players and monies, such as trading volumes or holdings. SIFMA
provides more granular timeframes than the FFoF but does not always break out which
sectors own which forms of money as the FFoF does. As another example, sources like the
BIS cover some forms of money (especially derivatives) in much greater detail than does
the FFoF.
For the purposes of this thesis, we employ the FFoF data, the categories of which are
presented in Figure 3.2. These data cover a significant number of players and monies,
provide enough granularity to gain analytical insight, and are published regularly and with
some frequency (each quarter). Therefore, the FFoF data serve as a foundation on which
we build a network which can later be expanded. We discuss the SIFMA and BIS sources
to note they also contain robust, publicly available data which are useful for future work.
Figure 3.2. Financial categories found in the FFoF. The sectors in the FFoF
have been grouped into similar categories. The categories are depicted by
the total size of their outstanding asset and liability holdings to depict a
basic understanding of the largest financial categories found in the FFoF
data. Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2019).
29
3.2 Data Curation: FFoF Data
We provide a high-level perspective of the characteristics of the raw FFoF data and the
process by which its various formats are programmatically cleaned and combined.
3.2.1 Raw Data Characteristics
The FFoF is released quarterly as a PDF file, with the underlying data available in comma-
separated value (.csv) and plain text (.txt) file formats.
PDF Files: Tabular Data
The FFoF PDF lists data primarily in tables presenting different perspectives on financial
information, such as overall transaction amounts, levels (i.e., total amounts of assets and
liabilities) held at the date of publication, and balance sheets. In most instances, the
information is presented in two different ways: a table shows a form of money, with
amounts broken down by constituent sectors, or it shows a sector, with amounts broken
down by constituent monies. For this thesis, we use the level view where tables represent
monies with amounts broken down by constituent sectors.
Each PDF document also provides categorization of sectors and monies; that is, some
sectors and monies are broken down further into sub-sectors and sub-monies. For example,
loans are a parent money, with mortgages as one of its sub-monies; mortgages are, in turn,
broken into more specific sub-monies, such as residential mortgages. In total, there are 35
money tables (L.200 to L.234) and 44 parent sectors and sub-sectors present across those
tables. Figure 3.3 shows table L.204 from the FFoF PDF.
Data within a table are assigned a unique identifier. The identifier is an 11-character
alphanumeric string, such as FL713120005 as shown in line 2 of table L.204 in Figure 3.3.
The identifier indicates the type of information (e.g., the data are seasonally adjusted and
that they represent levels); the money it represents; the sector holding that money; the
money’s classification (i.e., as an asset or liability for the sector); and whether the amount
connected to the identifier resulted from a calculation done by the Federal Reserve. It is
important to note that some identifiers are present in multiple tables, as the table for a parent
money sometimes lists the identifiers presented in the tables representing its sub-monies.
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Figure 3.3. Sample of table L.204 from the FFoF PDF. Note the table, 
identifiers, classification, quarter, and amount match against the information 
in our Pandas dataframe found in Figure 3.5. Amounts are rounded to 
the nearest tenth in the PDF. Source: Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System (2019).
CSV Files: Unique Identifiers
Each table has a corresponding .csv file. The file contains all the unique identifiers presented
in the FFoFPDF,with amounts assigned to those identifiers going back to 1945 on a quarterly
basis. The identifiers in the PDF differ slightly from those in the .csv and .txt files. In the
.csv and .txt files, the identifiers include a suffix denoting whether the data are reported
quarterly or annually. We use quarterly data in this thesis.
Text Files: Data Dictionaries
Each table has a corresponding .txt file that serves as the data dictionary for that table. Each
line of the .txt file lists the unique identifier, the sector, the money, the classification, the
line on which the identifier is found in the FFoF PDF, the table in which the identifier is
found, the units (generally in millions of dollars), and notes on seasonal adjustments.
3.2.2 Data Challenges
We address several challenges posed by the FFoF data and note others which must be taken
under consideration for future work.
31
Market Changes
The financial system changes frequently; as a result, the Federal Reserve frequently updates
the FFoF data to reflect those changes as well. The updates manifest in two ways. First, the
Federal Reserve adds new identifiers and drops old ones as sectors and monies are created
or disappear. Second, some identifiers have zero values associated with them. This is a
reflection of the first change — that is, a market which previously existed has effectively
disappeared at the point in time when the Federal Reserve published that iteration of the
FFoF.
Formatting Changes
The Federal Reserve has released the FFoF since the second quarter of 1996. They signifi-
cantly updated the formatting of the FFoF PDF in the first quarter of 2013; the formatting
has otherwise been consistent, but future analysts utilizing the FFoF data must review them
when they are released each quarter to ensure no formatting changes have occurred which
would necessitate updating the programming used to clean the data.
Also of note is that the .csv and .txt files were not included with the FFoF release until the
first quarter of 2016. This is an important consideration because the Federal Reserve revises
some of its data as more accurate information is gathered from reporting institutions. It is
possible to capture such revisions beginning in 1996 by comparing sequential releases of
the FFoF. However, the process of doing so would be highly manual without corresponding
.csv and .txt files for those releases.
Categorization
Some identifiers are present in more than one table as a result of the categorization scheme
described above. The categorizations for sectors and monies are laid out in the ‘List of Data
Tables’ in the PDF. The categorization scheme is used across tables (e.g., L.209 to L.213
are sub-tables of L.208) and within each table (i.e., sectors are broken into sub-sectors).
Therefore, we leverage the categorizations in the ‘List of Data Tables’ to include only the
lowest category tiers to avoid including an identifier more than once in our final dataset, as
we would otherwise overcount.
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Different Data Files
Since different elements needed for processing the data are in the PDF, .csv, and .txt files,
we leverage elements common to each file format to link the information in each of them.
The only element common to all three is the unique identifier, which we use to retrieve data
from the files and combine them into a single format.
3.2.3 Data Processing Tools
We use a variety of tools to import, clean, and combine the FFoF data.
Python
The Python programming language provides the overall architecture for the processing
implemented for this thesis. We choose Python because of its flexibility and maturity, which
are a result of the substantial number of libraries available for custom purposes (Python
Software Foundation 2020b). Regarding the pre-processing discussed here, Python has
native functionality which allows for reading .txt files line-by-line, which we use to read the
FFoF’s data dictionaries.
PyPDF2
PyPDF2 is a Python library which allows for ‘scraping’ a PDF to pull information from the
file (Python Software Foundation 2020a). We use PyPDF2 to determine the categorization
scheme from the level tables programmatically.
Pandas
Pandas is a Python library intended specifically for data analysis. The library’s dataframe
format for storing data allows for manipulations and calculations to be performed quickly
that may otherwise require a slow, computationally intensive implementation (McKinney
2010). Pandas has functionality for importing .csv files into a dataframe, which is used
to import the FFoF amounts. We combine the information found in the data dictionaries




We briefly summarize the pre-processing workflow we implement with these tools. We
present a visualization of our workflow in Figure 3.4.
Figure 3.4. Pre-processing workflow. The first three steps are repeated 35
times (once for every level table) before the initial dataframe is created.
Initial Dataframe
After downloading the necessary files (i.e., the FFoF PDF and its corresponding .csv and .txt
files), we begin by reading in a table’s data dictionary from the table’s .txt file line-by-line
and storing all the information therein. Next, we read in the .csv file corresponding to
that data dictionary, linking the information in the .txt and .csv files by using the unique
identifier found in both. Finally, we use the identifiers to determine the page on which the
table is found in the PDF; that page is then scraped to determine whether an identifier is at
the lowest categorization tier and tagged as such. We then combine and temporarily store
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this information. We repeat the process for every table and combine the temporarily stored
information from each table into a Pandas dataframe.
Attributes for Building a Network
At this stage, we store all the data from the various FFoF file formats in a single Pandas
dataframe. We create a separate dataframe from the initial dataframe by selecting only those
entries we previously tagged as being at the lowest categorization tier to avoid overcounting.
We then add several attributes to our newly-created dataframe to aid in construction of a
network.
• Abbreviated Names: The sector and money names in the FFoF are long enough that 
creating a network visualization with the full names makes the visualization illegible. 
We assign abbreviated names to each sector (e.g., S-01) and money (e.g., M-01) 
and populate them in a new column of the dataframe to improve the legibility of 
the visualizations we create later.
• Nodes: Nodes are essential components of a network, and we use existing 
information in the dataframe to create the network nodes explicitly. We add two new 
columns to the dataframe to denote the beginning and ending nodes for a network 
arc. Since money flows from an asset holder to a liability holder, the asset holder is 
always the beginning primary node, while the liability holder is always the ending 
primary node. Since the classification relates to money, money forms intermediate 
nodes. Therefore, one arc is directed from a sector as an asset holder of a given 
money to the intermediate node for that money. A second arc is then directed from 
the intermediate node to the sector which is the liability holder for that money. Note 
that monies frequently flow through intermediaries, namely operators. Furthermore, 
the FFoF data show who holds those monies at the date of publication. The sectors 
holding those monies differ over time.
• Arcs: Arcs are the other essential components of a network. We add a new column 
to the dataframe to create the network arcs. We take the newly-created beginning and 
ending node columns and concatenate them in a tuple representing a network arc. 
Each tuple is of the form (S-01, M-01) or (M-01, S-01).
• Top Sectors: If the user so desires, they may add a new column to the dataframe which 
denotes whether a sector is one of the biggest sectors in a money and classification
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group. The column tags sectors which comprise the top percent of a group; the user
designates this percentage. The user can then use the tag to select only those rows of
the dataframe which contain the top sectors.
Calculations
We perform two calculations and store them in the dataframe for every money and clas-
sification grouping. For example, all sectors holding residential mortgages as a liability
form one group, while all sectors holding Treasury securities as an asset form another. We
recognize there are many ways to group the data to gain different perspectives. We begin
with this grouping for the purposes of this thesis.
• Relative Weight: We determine each sector’s holding within its group as a percentage
of the overall group’s. We use the relative weight in visualizations to aid in quickly
seeing those sectors which are of the most importance for a given money; we accom-
plish this by using the relative weights to shade the directed arcs in the network. We
multiply every percentage by a factor of five to make all shadings easier to see.
• Cumulative Sum: We calculate the cumulative sum at each entry within a group.
The cumulative sum is necessary for the implementation of selecting the top sectors
by group described above.
3.3 Final Data Set Characteristics
After we add the network attributes and calculations, we create multiple .csv files. The
primary file contains the following information from the processed dataframe.
• From Node: The beginning node of an arc. This is either a sector or a money
abbreviation. It is the complement of the entry in the “To Node” column. For
example, if a sector is in the From Node column, a money is in the “To Node”
column.
• To Node: The ending node of an arc. This is either a sector or a money abbreviation.
It is the complement of the entry in the “From Node” column.
• Arc: A tuple combining the “From Node” and “To Node” columns.
• Instrument: The form of money that is in either the “From Node” or “To Node”
column.
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• Sector: The sector that is in either the “From Node” or “To Node” column.
• Asset/Liability: The classification of the sector’s holding of the money.
• Amount: The sector’s actual holding amount of a money, by classification.
• Instrument Weight: The calculation of the sector’s percentage of the money and
classification grouping to which it belongs, multiplied by five.
• Cumulative Weight: The cumulative weight calculation, ordered from the sectors
holding the greatest share of the group to the sectors holding the least share of the
group.
• Sector Color: The color assigned to a sector for visualization purposes.
• Instrument Color: The color assigned to a money for visualization purposes.
We also create two other .csv files which contain the legends of the sector and money
abbreviations. We do this to avoid recreating the legends by processing the “From Node”,
“To Node”, “Instrument”, and “Sector” columns of the primary .csv file.
3.4 Data Validation
As we discuss in Section 3.2.1, the .csv files for every table in the FFoF begin in 1945
and proceed quarterly. As a result, there are nearly 300,000 instances where our code must
accurately combine information from the associated FFoF PDF, .txt files containing the
FFoF data dictionaries, and the amounts in those .csv files. We validate our code works
properly in three ways.
First, the manner in which we construct the code in such a way that the unique identifiers
found in each table of the PDF must exactly match the same identifiers found in the .txt
and .csv files associated with that table. We also implement a high-level verification in our
code which ensures there are the same number of entries in the PDF, .csv, and .txt files.
Therefore, we expect our code works as desired.
Second, we verify the code results by randomly spot-checking the entries in the Pandas
dataframewe construct against the corresponding entries found in the FFoF PDF. Figure 3.5
illustrates our process with Table L.204 from the FFoF (from Figure 3.3).
Finally, we use the curated dataframe to create a number of network visualizations during
our analysis. Some of these visualizations demonstrate a balance of assets and liabilities,
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Figure 3.5. Sample selection from our Pandas dataframe. Note the table,
identifiers, classification (i.e., whether the money is a liability or asset), the
quarter, and the amount match with the Q3 column found in Figure 3.3.
broken down by money. If the assets and liabilities do not balance, we inspect further
and correct the underlying problem, if one exists. Such a problem may not exist because,
for some monies, the FFoF lists discrepancies between assets and liabilities. Since the
visualizations do not incorporate the discrepancies, they will necessarily show a slight
imbalance.
3.5 Summary
The FFoF data require extensive cleaning and processing to combine them into a single
format ready for follow-on work. Since pre-processing is time-intensive, we write the
final dataframe to .csv files, which completes the Data Curation stage in Figure 3.1. We
then reimport the .csv files in a separate Python file, where the overall analytical workflow
continues. We create a network and its visualizations in that workflow, which we discuss
further in Chapter 4.
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CHAPTER 4:
Analysis of a Market Map
Having previously described the techniques necessary to curate data for entities and rela-
tionships in the financial system, this chapter focuses on the network’s key features, network
analysis, and vulnerabilities in the observed network.
4.1 Key Network Features
We build a network of relationships between sectors and monies using NetworkX, a Python
programming language package meant for creating and analyzing networks (Hagberg et al.
2008). The network consists of 42 sectors as primary nodes and 25 monies as intermediate
nodes, and 430 arcs connecting them, grouped into the categories in Figure 4.1. We call
sectors primary nodes and monies intermediate nodes because capital flows between sectors
through monies.
Figure 4.1. Sector names, identifiers, and holding amounts by category. We
abbreviate sector and category names with identifiers to promote legibility
in figures. We group and color sectors into similar categories by category.
The listed amounts are the total assets and liabilities for each category.
Figure 4.2 lists each of the sectors, their abbreviated identifiers, and the total amount
invested in and by each sector, whereas Figure 4.3 lists each of the monies, their abbreviated
identifiers, and the total amount sectors invest in and borrow of thosemonies as of December
12, 2019, the most recent release of the FFoF data as of this writing (Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System 2019).
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Figure 4.2. Sector names, identifiers, and holding amounts by category. We
abbreviate sector and category names with identifiers to promote legibility
in figures. We group and color sectors into similar categories. The listed
amounts are the total assets and liabilities for each category.
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Figure 4.3. Money names, identifiers, and amounts invested. We abbreviate
money and category names with identifiers to promote legibility in visualiza-
tions. We group monies into similar categories and color them by category.
The listed amounts are the assets invested in each category (since assets
and liabilities generally balance in the FFoF data).
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Arcs connect sectors and monies. An arc begins at a sector node and is directed to a money
node if the sector holds that money as an asset, while an arc begins at a money node and
is directed to a sector node if the sector holds that money as a liability. The FFoF data
show monies broken down by sector holdings or vice-versa; as such, arcs are not directed
sector-to-sector or money-to-money. The network contains 430 of a possible 2,100 sector-
to-money and money-to-sector arcs. The remaining possible connections do not exist in the
FFoF data because for those combinations of sectors and monies, the sectors do not hold
those monies as either an asset or a liability.
This network of 67 nodes and 430 arcs is not large by modern computational standards, but
nonetheless, understanding its key structural features is not easy. The NetworkX package
includes support for visualizing graphs using different layout schemes, which we consider
as a starting point to “see” what we can in terms of structure and now investigate as part of
our network analysis.
4.2 Network Analysis
Because we have two types of nodes and the FFoF data precludes sector-to-sector or money-
to-money arcs, a bipartite graph may be useful. We begin with aggregation by category, as
this can help to eliminate noise caused by the large number of arcs relative to the number of
nodes, and illustrate the resulting bipartite graph in Figure 4.4. In this figure and subsequent
visualizations, arcs are colored according to a sector’s relative weight within a grouping of
a money and a holding classification, with darker shades reflecting a greater relative weight.
An arc’s thickness is determined by a scaled version of a sector’s actual holding amount of
a given money.
Figure 4.4 provides limited insight. We are able to observe only that category MC-10 (red
box) is sparsely connected with low holding amounts. This suggests the need for greater
granularity, despite the possibility of noise.
Figure 4.5 shows the financial network with nodes arranged in a simple circle and colored
by sector and money as defined in Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3. As a result of the increased
granularity in Figure 4.5 over Figure 4.4, we see sectors S-32 and S-33 (tan box) are the most
significant sectors in the Non-Financial Business category by connections and holdings. We
also see sector S-17 (teal box) is dominant amongst all sectors in terms of connections and
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Figure 4.4. We display the full network as a bipartite graph, with sectors and
monies grouped into their respective categories to reduce noise. However,
we are only able to see that one category, MC-10 (red box), is sparsely
connected, indicating the need for more granularity.
holding amounts. However, it is difficult to discern the most significant monies.
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Figure 4.5. Circular layout of financial network. Sector and money nodes 
are presented along the upper and lower halves of the circle, respectively, and 
are colored according to Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3. We see sectors S-32 and 
S-33 (tan box) are the most significant sectors in the Non-Financial Business 
category by connections and holdings. We also see sector S-17 (teal box) is 
dominant amongst all sectors in terms of connections and holding amounts. 
However, it is difficult to discern the most significant monies.
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The insights we gain due to the increased granularity in Figure 4.5 suggests it may be
beneficial to reproduce a bipartite graph of the full network, presented in Figure 4.6. Here,
we now see monies that are densely connected or have significant investments or liabilities,
such as M-06 (purple box), M-12, and M-13 (red box). We also see M-15 and M-18 have
the largest investments and liabilities amongst monies in the Loans category.
In general, connections from sectors to monies are not symmetric with connections from
monies to sectors. Figure 4.7 (showing liabilities in red) and Figure 4.8 (showing assets
in blue) illustrate the differences using two node incidence matrices, where sectors holding
greater amounts of a money are shaded more darkly if the amount they hold of a given
money is greater than a certain percentage of other sectors (e.g., it is shaded most darkly if
the amount held is greater than the amounts held by 90% of other sectors). We gain several
new insights from the visualizations.
First, we observe a much greater dispersion of assets than liabilities. In Figure 4.7, we see
that sectors in the Non-Financial Business category (tan oval) have both widely dispersed
liabilities and hold large amounts of those liabilities relative to other sectors, augmenting the
insight gained from Figure 4.5. We also note that sectors in the Retirement Funds category
hold very few liabilities (in some instances, none at all). This speaks to another potential
aggregation problem directly in the FFoF data, as sectors in Retirement Funds should hold
more monies as liabilities owed to households (sector S-17).
Finally, we compare Figure 4.8 with Figures 4.5 and 4.7. In Figure 4.8, we observe sectors in
the Fixed Income Securities category aremuchmore widely dispersed than any other sectors
and hold significant assets. The significance of those assets did not appear in Figures 4.5
or 4.6 because they are so widely dispersed; indeed, there are more sectors in the darkest
shades (top 50%) of every money in the Fixed Income Securities category than there are
for any other money outside that category, a point that illustrates both the dispersion and
amounts held in the category. In comparing Figure 4.8 with Figure 4.7, we see also see a
much greater dispersion of assets and a heavier concentration of liabilities (since assets and
liabilities balance).
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Figure 4.6. Bipartite layout of financial network. Sector nodes are on the
left, with monies on the right. The graph confirms the observations made
about important sectors in Figure 4.5. We can also see monies with large
investment and borrowing amounts, such as M-06 (purple box), M-12, and
M-13 (red box). We also see M-15 and M-18 (dark teal boxes) are the most

















































































































































































































































































Our visualization in Figure 4.4 is insufficiently granular for us to gain insights into the
network, but Figures 4.5, 4.6, 4.7, and 4.8 reveal some of its key features. The following
sections produce further insights by investigating node rankings, connectivity and density,
and node centrality.
4.2.1 Node Rankings
We now rank the nodes by their in- and out-degree. A sector’s in-degree represents
the number of monies it borrows, while its out-degree represents the number of monies
in which it invests. By contrast, a money’s in-degree represents the number of sectors
investing in that money, while its out-degree indicates the number of sectors borrowing that
money. Figures 4.9 and 4.10 rank sectors and monies, respectively. In a few instances in
Figure 4.10, the amount invested does not equal the amount borrowed. The FFoF tracks
these discrepancies as a separate line item and notes they are the result of “measurement
errors, missing information, and incompatibilities among data sources” (Board ofGovernors
of the Federal Reserve System 2019). Since the discrepancies are not attributed to any one
sector, we do not include them in the calculations for any ranking table.
By ranking nodes in this way, we gain further insight into concentration of capital and node
connectivity. A high in- and out-degree for a sector indicates high dispersion of liabilities
and assets, respectively, while for a money it indicates a high number of investors and
borrowers. In Figures 4.9 and 4.10, sectors and monies with both a high in-degree and high
out-degree are presented in yellow. Sectors and monies with a high in-degree and low out-
degree or vice-versa are presented in green. The combination of a high in- and out-degree
indicates wide dispersion, while a high in- and low out-degree (or vice-versa) indicates
either predominantly one type of activity (i.e., investing or borrowing), a concentration of
capital, or both. These differing combinations reveal the different roles sectors and monies
play in the financial system and therefore the different avenues for attacking them.
We observe in Figure 4.9 that there are four sectors (in yellow) that have large in- and
out-degree: S-11, S-32, S-33, and S-34. The sectors’ connections are also widely dispersed
across multiple categories, exposing them to a wide variety of monies and rendering them
more vulnerable to attack. We make a similar observation for monies M-08 and M-23 in
Figure 4.10.
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Figure 4.9. The largest sectors ranked by in-degree and out-degree, with their
corresponding liabilities and investments. Sectors highlighted in light yellow
have high in- and out-degree. Sectors highlighted in green have either a low
in-degree and high out-degree or vice-versa. Sectors highlighted in orange
have a high out-degree and disproportionately large assets.
By contrast, we see in Figure 4.9 sectors with low in-degree (in green): S-27 and S-41.
Sector S-27 has in-degree one but a large liability amount, indicating a concentration of
capital. In Figure 4.10, there are six monies with low in- or out-degree. In particular, M-05
has low out-degree as well as the largest amount borrowed, again indicating a concentration
of capital.
Finally, we observe the importance of sector S-17. In Figure 4.9, we see S-17 has the largest
out-degree and asset holdings.
A crisis of confidence caused in a well-connected node would cause significant harm since
the damage would readily spread. A concentration of capital is vulnerable due to the
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Figure 4.10. The largest monies ranked by in-degree and out-degree, with
their corresponding investments and liabilities. Monies highlighted in light
yellow have high in- and out-degree. Monies highlighted in green have either
a low in-degree and high out-degree or vice-versa.
high reward (from an attacker’s perspective) that concentration represents, as well as the
possibility there are relatively few points of failure. In an instance where a node is well-
connected and has a concentration of capital (as with sector S-17), the node may vulnerable
to multiple modes of attack.
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4.2.2 Network Connectivity and Density
We now discuss measures of connectivity and density in the network. We begin by present-
ing summary statistics in Figure 4.11. Note the network density is calculated using only
sector-to-money or money-to-sector arcs since other arcs are precluded by the structure of
the FFoF data.
Figure 4.11. Network connectivity and density statistics. Note that since the
network is only weakly connected, the diameter is only defined if the network
is undirected (U).
We draw the following conclusions from the statistics in Figure 4.11.
• The network contains more than 20% of all possible arcs, but the density is approx-
imate because the FFoF data do not provide sufficient granularity to determine one
sector’s claims on another sector. It is possible a sector which lends a certain money
could be directly connected to every sector which borrows that money, some sectors
which borrow that money, or just one sector which borrows that money. Therefore,
the network may be more or less dense than the current network indicates.
• From a mathematical perspective, the network is not strongly connected, so it is not
possible to begin from an arbitrary node in the directed network and reach any other
node.
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• The network is weakly connected, so it is possible to begin from an arbitrary node and
reach any other node if the network is undirected (i.e., it contains edges rather than
arcs). While direction is important in considering how money flows in the network,
it is just as important to know that such connections simply exist given the integral
relationship between lenders and borrowers. The existence of those connections
provides a path for damage from a financial warfare attack to be transmitted quickly
and directly from lender to borrower or vice-versa.
• If we consider only paths that begin and end with a primary sector node, the diameter
of the undirected network is five. Since there are no sector-to-sector or money-to-
money edges in the undirected network, two of the nodes on any of the longest shortest
paths are money nodes. Therefore, sector nodes are separated by at most one other
sector node.
• Furthermore, nearly 80% of all paths beginning and ending with a primary sector
node are of length three, indicating a potential direct connection via at least one
money between those sectors. Therefore, the damage caused by the failure of a given
sector or money is likely to spread rapidly throughout the network.
• There are 861 possible paths between sectors in the directed network, of which 565
(65.6%) exist. All the shortest paths have sectors which are either directly connected
or separated by one sector. The conclusion we draw about damage spreading rapidly
does not change when we consider direction.
We demonstrate the importance of our point-in-time analysis in Figure 4.12, which presents
holdings in the Equities category for Q3 2019. Sectors holding a given money as an asset
and a liability are on the left and the right, respectively. Figures 4.12 provide an alternate
view of density contextualized by the “flow” of investment from an asset to a liability holder.
They also allow for immediate identification of the largest lenders and borrowers within a
money category (and by individual money). For example, we quickly see sectors S-17 and
S-26 (teal boxes) alone comprise more than half of M-05, the largest money in the category.
Sectors S-17 and S-26 are Households and Non-Profit Organizations and Mutual Funds,
respectively, and money M-06 is Corporate Equities. Since households own most of
the capital invested in mutual funds, we see they invest more than half the capital in
Corporate Equities, one of the two biggest markets through which businesses raise funds.
Furthermore, sector S-17 provides significant capital to S-33 (tan box) as the only investor
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in M-06. We conclude the borrowing sectors are heavily dependent upon S-17, and any
attack which damages S-17 would immediately and directly impact those sectors as well.
Figure 4.12 focuses on the Equities category, but similar diagrams focusing on the other
money categories may yield similar insights.
4.2.3 Network Centrality
We conclude our network analysis with a brief discussion on centrality, illustrated in
Figure 4.13. A node’s eigenvector centrality is determined both by how well-connected the
node is and how well-connected the nodes to which it is connected are.
We observe in Figure 4.13 that the fivemost central money nodes areM-08, M-10, M-07, M-
01, and M-20. The five most central sector nodes are S-32, S-16, S-17, S-06, and S-18. All
but M-01 and S-06 are noted in Figures 4.10 and 4.9. Therefore, Figure 4.13 confirms our
previous insights while also suggesting other nodes are of significance which we have not
already observed. Because eigenvector centrality measures howwell-connected a node is by
considering the node’s and its neighbors’ connections, it provides insight into the network’s
most important nodes, particularly when we combine that view with the magnitude of the
assets and liabilities of those nodes.
Our analysis has demonstrated several important points. First, top-level aggregation is too
coarse to gain much insight, whereas we are able to observe important network features
with greater granularity. Our visualizations also yield different insights, which suggests
there may be other network features that would be revealed by different visualizations.
Finally, those insights include different dominant sectors and monies from a dispersion
and concentration perspective, which provide different opportunities for attack which we


































































































































































Our analysis of network structure is important in that it helps to reveal key features relevant
to the vulnerability of the financial network. Building on the discussion in Section 2.5,
there are several broad vulnerabilities we consider.
Single points of failure. We first consider areas of the network where there are few players.
A reliance on a few critical nodes or connectors creates a vulnerability because an attack
on them may disable a key activity in the financial system. As a result, highly concentrated
nodes offer high rewards (from an attacker’s perspective), either because of the impact that
a loss of a large amount of capital or borrowing would have or because the nodes might
represent single points of failure. In general, examples of highly concentrated nodes include
players such as large asset managers (e.g., Fidelity, Vanguard, Blackrock) and operators in
trade processing (DTCC). Imagine seeing a zeroed-out retirement account and the impact
this could have on the entire investment market — as happened with Fidelity in February
2020 (Malito 2020). In our financial network, we observe several highly concentrated nodes,
including M-05 (Corporate Equities), S-17 (Households and nonprofit organizations), and
S-33 (Nonfinancial noncorporate business).
Places of widespread impact. Next, we consider those players who participate broadly
throughout the financial system — that is, they are highly dispersed. These participants
represent a vulnerability because an attack on them could resonate throughout the financial
system. For example, an attack which causes a crisis of confidence would become a
contagion in the financial system due to the high connectivity of such nodes. This kind
of attack could make players afraid to invest in or borrow monies or lend to or borrow
from sectors critical to the functioning of the financial system. For example, many players
invested in collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs) prior to the 2008 financial crisis.
At that time, CMOs were a highly dispersed money whose failure immediately impacted the
players investing in it, as well as players and monies that were effectively collateral damage
(Kagan 2020) — especially individuals and families who lost their homes. Examples of
highly connected participants are individuals and/or households who rely on their ability
to access funds and complete financial transactions, amongst other activities. We observe
several highly dispersed nodes throughout our analysis, including M-08 (Corporate and
foreign bonds), S-32 (Nonfinancial corporate business), and S-17 (Households and nonprofit
organizations).
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Some nodes in our financial network represent both high dispersion and a high concentration
of capital, which renders them vulnerable to multiple methods of attack. Sectors S-17
(Households and nonprofit organizations), S-32 (Nonfinancial corporate business), and
S-33 (Nonfinancial noncorporate business) are examples.
We also observe some nodes are important across most or all of the visualizations we
employ, which suggests they are systemically important and therefore represent the greatest
vulnerabilities. Those nodes include S-17 (Households andNon-Profit Organizations), S-32
(Non-Financial Corporate Business), S-33 (Non-Financial Non-Corporate Business), and
M-08 (Corporate and Foreign Bonds).
Robustness.We define players and monies as robust if they have a system of checks and
balances, regulatory oversight, a high degree of standardized interaction, low complexity,
and fast transaction or settlement speed. If players or monies lack one of these features,
it is easier to attack them and possibly more than once if the attacker cannot be identified
because of a lack of robustness. Examples are complex monies, such as some financially
engineered instruments, some payment platforms, and crypto-currencies.
Rapid growth.We examine players and monies demonstrating rapid growth in the network
from one period to the next; that growth may be in holdings (in the case of players and
monies) or the number of participants (in the case of monies). Areas in the network experi-
encing rapid growth may require meaningful expertise or suggest increased stress to other
players and/or monies as they gain relative importance in the financial system. Examples
in the current markets are financial technology (FinTech) payment platforms, financial en-
gineered instruments such as some collateralized loan obligations (CLOs), leveraged loan
products and exchange-traded funds (ETFs), crypto-currencies, and exchanges, among oth-
ers. The growth of CMOs, the market for which was largest in 2007 (less than a year before
the financial crisis began in earnest), is just one example (Kagan 2020).
The vulnerabilities we discuss here are by no means exhaustive but are meant to be il-
lustrative. More importantly, they are are determined only from a point-in-time analysis.
The ability to generate the network, its features, and its visualizations quickly allows us to




Changes in Maps Over Time
Our techniques for automating the process of collecting, curating, and integrating different
sources of financial data into a market map are important, in that they allow us to apply
various network analysis tools for understanding key structural features and potential vul-
nerabilities. However, the connectivity of the financial system— as defined in this thesis by
the holdings of different sectors — can change over time. This feature makes the financial
system different from many other critical infrastructures whose connectivity is physical
(e.g., roads) and tends to change very slowly, if at all. A point-in-time analysis can reveal
insights into the financial system’s vulnerabilities, but analysis of an outdated map could
lead to false conclusions about the system’s vulnerabilities. Because players, operators, and
monies can quickly and regularly reshuffle their relationships in the financial system, it is
also critical to analyze how the system changes.
The dynamic nature of the financial system makes it somewhat unique in its structure
relative to those other infrastructure systems and presents different challenges for studying
its vulnerabilities. Fortunately, the techniques in this thesis for producing market maps
quickly and consistently opens the door for an entirely new type of analysis related to these
changes in the structure of the financial system.
In the following sections, we present examples to demonstrate the changing nature of the
financial system and how its vulnerabilities may evolve over time.
5.1 Changes in the Financial System Over Time
By comparing the structure of the financial network at different time periods, we get a sense
of the way in which capital has moved. Figure 5.1 contrasts holdings in the Loans category
for the fourth quarter of 2008 and third quarter of 2019 (the most recently available data),
respectively.
We observe three important points in Figure 5.1. First, the number of lending sectors has
increased while the number of borrowing sectors has decreased between Q4 2008 to Q3
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Figure 5.1. Loans category for Q4 2008 (top) and Q3 2019 (bottom). The
relative size of sector S-09 decreases significantly from 2008 to 2019 (green
box), whereas the relative size of sectors S-12 and S-13 (orange boxes) in
their holdings of money M-18 (dark green box) are swapped over this period.
There is an increase in the number of borrowing sectors and a decrease in
the number of lending sectors from 2008 to 2019.
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2019. Therefore, different sectors represent vulnerabilities in the Loans market and may be
impacted by an attack on it.
Second, some sectors have increased or decreased their asset holdings. We see that sector
S-13 (first orange box) has substantially increased its asset holdings. Conversely, sectors
S-09 (green box) and S-12 (second orange box) have substantially decreased their asset
holdings.
Finally, we can see some sectors investing in new monies, eliminating their holdings of
monies, or filling in for other sectors over time. In Q4 2008, sector S-12 was the largest
asset holder of money M-18 (dark green box), while sector S-13 held no assets of M-18.
By Q3 2019, S-13 is now the largest asset holder of M-18, while S-12’s holdings of M-18 is
dramatically reduced. This suggests that, over time, S-13 gradually took over the role once
filled by S-12.
Furthermore, there are significant changes in the Loans category between Q4 2008 and
Q3 2019. Figure 5.2 demonstrates three different values for sectors holding monies in the
Loans category. The first value is the actual increase in a sector’s holding of assets (in blue)
or liabilities (in red) between Q4 2008 and Q3 2019. The second value is the percentage
increase that change represents relative to the sector’s holding of that money in Q4 2008.
The third value shows how much that increase represented as a percentage of the assets
or liabilities held of that money by all sectors in Q4 2008. Every sector in Figure 5.2
increased its holdings in Q3 2019 over Q4 2008 by at least 100%. Most strikingly, we
observe that S-13’s assets of M-18 increase approximately $4.5 trillion, which represents a
1,047% increase in S-13’s assets of M-18 and more than 40% of the assets of M-18 held by
all sectors in Q4 2008.
Figure 5.3 also demonstrates three different values for sectors holding monies in the Loans
category. The first value is the actual decrease in a sector’s holding of assets (in blue)
or liabilities (in red) between Q4 2008 and Q3 2019. The second value is the percentage
decrease that change represents relative to the sector’s holding of that money in Q4 2008.
The third value shows how much that increase represented as a percentage of the assets or
liabilities held of that money by all sectors in Q4 2008. Every sector in Figure 5.3 decreased
its holdings in Q3 2019 over Q4 2008 by at least 50%. We see sector S-09’s assets of M-18
decrease more than $1.5 trillion (from more than $2 trillion to around $1 trillion), which is
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a 78% reduction in S-09’s assets of M-18 and nearly 14% of the assets of M-18 held by all
sectors in Q4 2008. We also see that sector S-15 completely eliminated its assets of money
M-16, and similarly, sector S-09 reduced its assets of money M-15 by more than 97%,
which demonstrates the disappearance of a sector from a market. Figures 5.2 and 5.3 give
insight into the vulnerabilities surrounding rapidly growing sectors and monies we discuss
in Section 4.3, as well as the sectors that have become relatively less important over time.
We gain more information about the actual changes in a sector’s holding amounts of a
money with diagrams such as Figure 5.4. Figure 5.4 shows compares sectors S-09, S-12,
and S-13. The figure includes those sectors’ eigenvector centralities, amounts borrowed or
invested in money M-18, and in- and out-degree for Q4 2008 and Q3 2019 compared side-
by-side. With such diagrams, we can immediately see how the sector’s overall connectivity
in the network (as measured by the eigenvector centrality, in-degree, and out-degree) and
borrowing and lending activities have changed between the two time periods. For example,
we see that Issuers of Asset-backed Securities (sector S-09) had significant lending and
borrowing activities in moneyM-18 in Q4 2008 but had nearly eliminated all such activities
by Q3 2019. Conversely, we see the opposite is true of Government-sponsored Enterprises
(sector S-13).
We also note that the in-degree, out-degree, and eigenvector centrality of the sectors do not
change. In the case of S-13, we observe in Figure 5.1 the sector did not invest in M-18
in Q4 2008 but does as of Q3 2019. Since the connectivity of S-13 does not change, the
sector’s assets and liabilities must have shifted. Moreover, the growth of a sector’s assets
and liabilities while its connectivity remains static indicates a concentration of capital in an































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Notable Decreases ($ Billions) in Loans Category From Q4 2008 to Q3 2019
S-01 S-03 S-08 S-09 S-11 S-12 S-15 S-17 S-32
$10.3 B $35.6 B
53% 58%
0.4% of M-14 1.4% of M-14 
$595.1 B $60.9 B
98% 68%
23.3% of M-15 2.3% of M-15
$131.7 B $289.8 B
51% 100%
5.3% of M-16 10.8% of M-16 
$3.3 B
69%
2.5% of M-17 
$5.6 B $313.9 B $1,553.8 B $2,798.4 B $52.6 B
67% 78% 78% 58% 51%
0.0% of M-18 2.8% of M-18 13.8% of M-18 24.9% of M-18 0.5% of M-18 
$74.1 B $19.0 B
63% 52%
8.7% of M-19 0.2% of M-19 
$63.1 B
66%








Figure 5.3. We present sectors and their holdings in monies for both assets
(blue) and liabilities (red). The first entry in each cell shows the actual
decrease in holdings. The second entry shows the percent decrease relative
to what the sector held in Q4 2008. The third entry shows how much
that decrease represented as a percentage of the assets or liabilities held of
that money by all sectors in Q4 2008. Every sector presented decreased its
holdings by at least 50%.
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Figure 5.4. Radar plots for sectors S-09, S-12, and S-13 in Q4 2008 and Q3
2019. We observe the connectivity of each sector remains the same, while
their assets and liabilities of money M-18 change substantially.
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5.2 Further Vulnerabilities
We now discuss potential vulnerabilities we identify using the temporal views in Section 5.1
and the importance of analyzing differences in the financial system over time by contrasting
those views with our discussion in Section 4.3.
In Section 5.1, we observe the growing importance of sector S-13 to money M-18 and the
Loans category generally, along with the relative decline of sectors S-09 and S-12. In Q4
2008, sectors S-09 and S-12 represented potential vulnerabilities. Indeed, S-09 is Issuers
of Asset-backed Securities, and S-12 is Agency- and GSE-backed Mortgage Pools, both
of which represented vulnerabilities in the financial system because of their exposures to
residential mortgages — or money M-18. Since Q4 2008, these sectors have largely been
supplanted by S-13, or Government-sponsored enterprises. other potential vulnerabilities
we identify by combining the analysis and visualizations in Chapter 4 with temporal views.
In Section 4.3, we identify severalmonies and sectors that represent potential vulnerabilities,
includingmoniesM-05 andM-08 and sectors S-17, S-32, and S-33. By contrast, we identify
S-13 as a potential vulnerability due to its increased importance to money M-18 and the
Loans market generally. We note that S-13 did not appear in any of the point-in-time
visualizations or analyses as an important node. Therefore, the temporal view we discuss
in this chapter identifies a potential vulnerability which would be missed if one were to rely
upon only a point-in-time analysis.
5.3 Opportunities for Additional Analyses
The automation of creating the network enables the fast comparison of changes across two
periods in time. We propose several views for future work.
Obtain a snapshot of sector assets and liabilities. By comparing snapshots, we can
determine how a sector’s investing and borrowing behavior has changed over time.
Establish a significance threshold for each money and sector. By establishing a signif-
icance threshold, we can identify new sectors as they enter the market for a given money.
Conversely, we can also identify sectors that are no longer significant. We can do the same
for monies to identify emerging and disappearing markets.
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Identify holding concentration.We can see growing concentrations of assets or liabilities
by comparing map iterations. Concentrated holdings represent few or single points of
failure.
Identify dispersion. Conversely, we can compare map iterations to see greater dispersion of
holdings (i.e., sectors investing their capital in or borrowingmore monies than other sectors)
or of sectors (i.e., more sectors investing in or borrowing a given money). Dispersion in
either form can support the financial system by having more sectors available to support
the market for a money should another sector fail, but it can also expose more sectors to
damage from the failure of another sector or a money.
Investigate maturity profiles of monies. The connections between sectors represented by
monies last for different amounts of time. For example, an equity trade connects two sectors
for one day (the time it takes to settle the trade), while mortgages can last for up to 30 years.
Comparingmap iterations bymoney can provide insight into how behavior in markets differ.
Analyze turnover. The FFoF data we use to build the network in this thesis show end-of-
quarter holdings. As such, those data do not reflect turnover, or how often a money is
traded. For example, some players hold relatively few assets or liabilities at any one time
but trade monies very frequently, such as algorithmic traders. These players would appear
to have relatively little market exposure using a point-in-time analysis. However, due to
constant changes in the market, their frequent trading substantially increases their overall
exposure, and as such, the activities of these players are ideally suited for a temporal analysis
that cannot be captured by the FFoF level data we use.
These examples are not exhaustive but provide several views that can reveal vulnerabilities
that would not otherwise be captured by a point-in-time analysis. Therefore, it is important
to consider multiple network perspectives.
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CHAPTER 6:
Summary and Follow-On Work
We conclude by summarizing the work we present in this thesis, describing the limitations
on our efforts, and recommendations for follow-on work to improve the network approach
we employ.
6.1 Summary of Current Efforts
Warfare is continually evolving, andmodernwarfare incorporates hybrid elements that often
target important infrastructure to achieve military goals. The financial system is a critical
infrastructure sector; we rely upon it, whether explicitly or implicitly, for nearly every facet
of our daily lives. It supports other critical infrastructure sectors and U.S. national security.
Recognizing that our adversaries have considered financial warfare as a means to leverage
U.S. infrastructure vulnerabilities to overcome their disadvantages in traditional warfare,
we work to create a network representation of the financial system, which provides us with
a different perspective on potential vulnerabilities.
We begin to create the network by first establishing a set of criteria for its underlying data.
The data must be comprehensive, in that they cover the most significant monies, players,
and operators; manageable, in that they balance granularity with the ability to aggregate
the data; reliable, in that they come from a trusted organization; regular, in that they are
published with enough frequency to allow for timely network creation and analysis; and
confirmable, in that data from multiple sources largely agree. We identify several sources
which meet most or all of these criteria, such as the Federal Reserve, BIS, and SIFMA. We
focus the efforts of this thesis on the Federal Reserve’s FFoF to lay a foundation that will
be built upon by future work.
We specifically focus on the FFoF’s level data, which are end-of-quarter sector holding
amounts of each money tracked in the FFoF. We develop a computational workflow to
import the data, which are contained in three file formats: a PDF release of the overall
quarterly FFoF report, comma-separated value (.csv) files containing holding amounts for
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the current and historical quarters, and plain-text (.txt) files containing the data dictionary
for each table of level data. We then programmatically clean the data and organize it into a
format suitable for our analysis. The curated data set is a critical end-product; we use it to
create a network that we analyze and visualize to identify key features.
We analyze the network in two general ways. First, we look at the network at a specific
point in time. Using this approach, we identify sectors and monies that are either highly
connected, have large concentrations of capital, or both and which therefore represent
vulnerabilities in the financial system. These include monies M-05 and M-08 and sectors
S-17, S-32, and S-33.
Second, we compare the network at multiple points in time, which we are able to do as a
result of our work to automate the network’s creation. By comparing network iterations,
we identify sectors that enter or exit certain markets or which become prominent in them
and therefore to the financial system as a whole. For example, we identify sector S-13 as
becoming a prominent lender of money M-18 in Q3 2019 where it had not been active at
all in Q4 2008, while sectors S-09 and S-12 greatly reduce their lending activity for M-18.
6.2 Limitations
Our work is limited in several ways, some of which are general and others specific to our
use of the FFoF.
6.2.1 General Limitations
Thefinancial system is global in nature. Ourwork creates a network only of theU.S. financial
system. Therefore, we are unable to determine the ramifications that the failure of a
component of the global financial system would have on the U.S. financial system.
There are a number of activities for which it is not possible to obtain data. Some examples
include financial transactions carried out via cryptocurrencies (which are designed for
anonymity); so-called “dark pools,” which are owned by financial institutions and which
allow investors to engage in financial transactions privately; and criminal activity. These
and other enterprises likely account for significant financial transactions that cannot be
captured by a network.
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The U.S. financial system is different from other financial systems around the world in key
ways. For example, eighty percent of capital in the U.S. is raised via markets, while the
remaining 20% is borrowed from banks; the converse is true in Europe. Therefore, lessons
learned from a network of the U.S. financial system do not necessarily translate over to
other financial systems.
The network we create focuses on monies and players; it does not include operators.
Operators are critical to the stable functioning of the financial system. As such, they
represent another possible avenue for financial warfare attacks.
Finally, our network analysis is oriented only from a defensive perspective of the U.S. fi-
nancial system. We might gain different insights by taking an offensive approach towards
the U.S. financial system.
6.2.2 FFoF Limitations
The Federal Reserve meets our criteria as a reliable source. However, there are limitations
associated with our use of its data.
Although the FFoF contains data on many significant monies and players, there are several
it does not, especially derivatives. As such, our network cannot capture the impact of those
missing monies and players.
We use data from the level tables of the FFoF. Using the level data, we obtain both an
end-of-quarter snapshot of a sector’s holding amounts of the monies tracked in the FFoF
as well as temporal changes by comparing data from different quarters. However, the FFoF
contains data on overall trading amounts; these differ significantly from level amounts, as
they also capture fluctuations in the price of a money and trading volumes. Therefore, we
could gain further insight by using different types of data, either from the FFoF or other
sources.
None of the tables in the FFoF are sufficiently granular to allow us to calculate the claims of
one sector directly upon another. As such, we cannot determine which sectors are directly
connected via one another and must use their connections via mutual monies as a proxy.
The FFoF is published quarterly. In some instances, this is too infrequent to allow timely
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analysis. For example, during the 2008 financial crisis, the failure of key financial institu-
tions and the crisis of confidence that precipitated a drop in the prices of certain monies
unfolded over approximately two weeks.
Because we do not use data outside the FFoF, we are unable to reconcile our findings from
an outside perspective.
6.3 Future Work
There are several avenues for future work to improve upon the foundation we establish in
thesis.
The most immediate area for improvement is to add in more data on the U.S. financial
system. Doing so addresses many of the limitations on our current work:
• We can improve upon the quarterly frequency with which the network is currently
generated.
• We can include more monies and players to assess other potential vulnerabilities.
• We can capture the importance of operators to the financial system, as well as those
which constitute potential vulnerabilities.
• We can improve the granularity with which we are able to analyze the network.
• We can reconcile data from multiple sources.
In the long-term, it will be useful to add in global data to construct networks of the financial
systems of other countries and to create a network of the global financial system. Doing so
would provide a view of how the U.S. would be affected by failures of components of the
global system or yield offensive rather than defensive insights, such as how an adversary
might indirectly attack the U.S. by directly attacking another entity intimately connected to
the U.S.
As the fidelity and accuracy of these network maps improves, it will become possible to
apply other analytical tools tailored for use on networks, such as Attacker-Defender models
(e.g., Brown et al. 2006). We expect that the application of such tools will provide even
more insight into this timely and important problem.
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APPENDIX A:
Key Elements of the Financial System
This Appendix briefly describes elements of the financial system and their activities. They
are important for understanding the operations of and relationships between financial system
components and therefore constitute areas of potential vulnerability. While the list is meant
to encompass major elements and activities, it is not exhaustive due to the extensive and
changing nature of the financial system. More detailed information on money, players, and
operators can be found in Appendix B.
Payment and settlement systems enable the efficient transfer of money for completing (i.e.,
settling) transactions. They act as intermediaries between a buyer and seller to minimize
the risk that one of the parties does not honor their obligation. Examples include FedWire,
Clearing House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS), and stock exchanges.
Some organizations are responsible for the secure storage of information concerning finan-
cial transactions, and the electronic systems those organizations use may be susceptible
to compromise. Examples of these organizations include the DTCC, line entry at banks,
pension funds, asset managers, and Social Security. Individuals are particularly vulnera-
ble with respect to these systems, as their deposits, borrowings, or other investments are
typically line entry items.
Some monies are of greater relative importance than others from the perspective that they
connect large numbers of players; the failure of suchmonies can therefore have a widespread
effect. An example, CLOs, helps to explain the concept. This form of money is a derivative
since it derives its value from underlying assets (i.e., loans made by banks). CLOs are
then split into tranches, which are groups or features of the underlying loans that create
an expected level of investor risk. These tranches are sold to investors. Therefore, CLOs
connect multiple borrowers, investors, and operators (those which create the CLOs). Other
examples include ETFs, hedge funds, and stocks in the S&P 500.
Financial firms are organizations that comprise players and operators beyond those which
provide payment and settlement services. Examples include stock exchanges, such as the
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Nasdaq and S&P 500; financial service providers, such as SWIFT, banks, and mortgage
companies; and regulators, such as the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) and Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC).
Generally, liquidity reflects the ease and speed with which money can be bought, sold, or
otherwise traded. For example, currency is often very liquid, while real estate is relatively
illiquid. Here, we refer to liquidity as money which is highly liquid. Beyond currency,
examples include money market funds, checking accounts, equities of large capitalization
companies, treasuries, and many derivatives.
Risk transfer or return shifts various types of financial risk (e.g., stock market or default
risk) from the primary party facing the risk to a secondary party. The secondary party
receives a premium for taking on the risk, while the primary party is protected if the risk is
realized. While insurance is a common form of risk transfer, there are other forms, such as
derivatives, which may be used either to hedge (i.e., protect) against risk to minimize losses
or to take on greater risk to maximize rewards.
Widespreadmarket behaviors can amplify normal cyclical changes in financial markets (i.e.,
they are procyclical). Examples include riskmanagement techniques that rely upon common
statistical approaches — e.g., Value at Risk (VaR) and Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT),
both of which are widely used by portfolio managers (Harper 2019; McClure 2019) — and
algorithmic trading driven by machine learning techniques.
Blockchain-based activities, first proposed by two computer scientists in 1991 (Haber and
Stornetta 1990), began to see widespread use with the advent of cryptocurrencies (e.g.,
Bitcoin). Many industries are implementing blockchain technologies. In particular, the
financial services industry is beginning to use them to speed up and anonymize contract
settlements to save money (Kelly 2016; Hackett 2016; Fortney 2019).
Other emerging activities are beginning to bypass or fill the roles held by traditional financial
service companies, such as borrowing (whether from fundraising or lending) and payment
processing. Crowdfunding platforms, such asKickstarter andGoFundMe, allow users either
to circumvent or to engage in new forms of borrowing; users have raisedmore than $9 billion
since the inception of those platforms in 2009 and 2010, respectively. GoFundMe users
alone raise approximately $140 million per month (Nguyen 2019; Harris 2017; Monroe
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2019). Peer-to-peer lending websites, such as LendingClub, allow a person or group of
people to lend to a borrower and therefore directly replace traditional lending sources (e.g.,
banks). From LendingClub’s inception in 2007 through the third quarter of 2019, users
have lent more than $40 billion (LendingClub 2019). New peer-to-peer payment platforms,
such as Venmo, allow a person to send money directly to another person. Venmo users
sent more than $19 billion in the fourth quarter of 2018, with the total value of peer-to-peer
transactions estimated to be $156 billion that year (Eckstein 2019). These examples are
relatively new, but it is important to recognize that emerging activities like them have the
potential to change fundamental aspects of the structure of the financial system.
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APPENDIX B:
Abbreviated Dictionary of the Financial System
As defined in this thesis, participants in the financial system fall into one of three general
categories: players, operators, and monies. For purposes of convenience, we include the
following working definitions. Unless otherwise noted, we adopt definitions as presented
in Investopedia (2020).
The entries are presented alphabetically, with a note on whether the entry is for a player,
operator, or money. In the case of monies, we also note to which market (equities, fixed-
income, or other) that money belongs. The equities markets deal with equity securities in
a business; that is, the participant owns a share of that business and therefore has equity in
it. The fixed-income markets deal with various forms of debt securities, from which the
participant receives fixed income of some sort, usually in the form of interest.
Agency- and GSE-Backed Securities (money, fixed-income market). These monies in-
clude securities issued by certain federal agencies, government-sponsored enterprises, and
agency- and GSE-backed mortgage pools (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System 2019). Most of the securities are mortgage-backed securitys (MBSs), a security
collateralized by a grouping of mortgages and that provides periodic payments, which are
determined by a share of the principal and interest payments of the underlying mortgages.
Brokerages (operator). A brokerage, or brokerage company, connects two parties for
various financial transactions. For example, a brokerage may connect a buyer and seller for
a security (e.g., stocks or bonds), a borrower with a bank (e.g., for a mortgage), or assist
clients in finding insurance. Some brokerages also provide financial advice, while others
provide a platform which allows individual investors to buy and sell securities.
Checkable Deposits and Currency (money, other markets). These monies primarily
include variations of demand deposit accounts and currency not held by the Treasury. A
demand deposit account is an account held with a banking institution which can be drawn
upon without notifying the institution —- i.e., on demand. This is effectively a checking
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account, or an account against which checks may be written without notice to the institution,
hence a checkable deposit.
Clearing Houses (operator). A clearing house acts as a middleman for a buyer and seller in
a financial transaction and ensures the transaction takes place according to terms previously
agreed upon by the buyer and seller—-that is, they ensure funds or assets change hands as
agreed. There is inherently risk in every financial transaction: the seller might not produce
the asset being sold, or the buyer might not have sufficient funds, in which case either
party might attempt to renege on the transaction. A clearing house takes on the risk of the
transaction to ensure the buyer receives the asset and the seller receives the funds, thereby
providing stability in those transactions. The clearing house does this by temporarily taking
on the position opposite both the buyer and seller; that is, they are the counterparty to
the buyer (where the seller was when the transaction began) and the counterparty to the
seller (where the buyer was when the transaction began), a process known as offsetting.
Some clearing houses ensure payments and assets are exchanged (e.g., funds for a security),
while others ensure transfer of funds (i.e., a check clears when cashed). Clearing houses
also ensure trades are settled, i.e., assets and funds are delivered to the appropriate party.
Examples of the first type of clearing house include those of each financial exchange, while
an example of the second type is FedACH, an ACH managed by the federal government.
DTCC. The DTCC is one of the world’s largest financial services organizations. It
integrates the functions of its subsidiaries, including clearing houses and a central
securities depository. Because the central securities depository holds a large volume
of assets, it allows transactions to be cleared by the clearing houses by crediting
and debiting accounts rather than requiring the actual transfer of the securities be-
tween parties, thereby allowing transactions to be completed much more quickly and
efficiently.
Commercial Banks (operator). Commercial banks are also part of U.S.-chartered depos-
itory institutions as a player. From an operator perspective, they provide key financial
services, especially to individuals, such as checking and savings accounts, basic investment
vehicles (e.g., certificates of deposit), installment credit (e.g., mortgages or car loans), and
revolving credit (e.g., credit cards).
78
Consumer Credit (money, fixed-income market). These monies include loans to individ-
uals in the households sector, not including mortgages. The loans include, for example,
credit cards, car loans, and student loans (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
2019).
Corporate and Foreign Bonds (money, fixed-income market). These monies are various
debts issued by domestic corporations (financial and non-financial) and foreign organiza-
tions (held by domestic entities). These monies focus primarily on bonds, although some
others (e.g., notes) are included.
Corporate Equities (money, equities market). These monies include common and pre-
ferred shares in both financial and non-financial corporations, including U.S.-held shares
of foreign corporations (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2019).
Custodian Banks (operator). Custodian banks are so-called because their primary purpose
is to provide a safe repository for securities — that is, the securities are in the custody of
the bank.
Derivatives (money, other markets). A derivative is a financial money based on another
asset; the performance of that asset determines the derivative’s value (i.e., the value is
derived from the asset). Derivatives encompass many types of monies, such as futures and
swaps; the latter of these is the means by which risk is traded between financial institutions.
Derivatives are not outlined in the FFoF but represent such a large market we include them
here, with the gross market value of derivatives estimated to be $12.7 trillion in 2018,
according to the BIS (Maverick 2018).
Direct Investment (money, other markets). These monies include large investments made
by domestic entities in foreign entities or vice-versa; an investment is considered large if
it constitutes at least a 10% stake in the foreign entity (Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System 2019).
Electronic Funds Transferrers (operator). Electronic funds transferrers are organizations
which facilitate the transfer of funds between two bank accounts. It is a broad category
which includesACHorganizations, wire transfer organizations (e.g., FedWire), and payment
companies (e.g., Visa) (Kenton 2019a).
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Federal Funds and Security Repurchase Agreements (money, fixed-income market).
Thesemonies include federal funds, which are used byU.S.-chartered depository institutions
to meet a minimum reserve balance with the Federal Reserve, and security repurchase
agreements, also known as repos. In a repo, a buyer purchases a security from the seller,
with a promise from the seller to repurchase the security a short time later; the “interest” on
this “loan” is the difference in the sale and repurchase prices. The security underpinning
the repo serves as collateral (Reiff 2020).
Federal Government (player). This sector includes all parts of the U.S. federal government
as delineated in the federal budget. The liabilities for the federal government are smaller
than the overall public debt because they do not include treasury securities held within the
federal government itself — that is, the federal government effectively owing itself money
(Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2019).
Financial Communications (operator). A financial communications firm provides a se-
cure network for financial institutions, especially banks, to exchange financial information.
SWIFT is the world’s primary provider of this network; it is used to place payment orders
between institutions (Schwartz 2016).
Financial Corporations (player). In the FFoF data, this is broken out in only one location,
under Corporate Equities. It is not, however, described as its own sector in the FFoF; the
data indicate that public and closely-held financial corporations are included, though (Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2019).
Financial Exchanges (operator). A financial exchange provides a marketplace where
monies can be traded. There are several exchanges in the U.S. The two largest and most
well-known are the New York Stock Exchange and the NASDAQ.
Fund Shares (money, equities market). These monies include shares of money market
and mutual funds. They may be redeemed by the owner at any time (Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System 2019).
Funds (player). In the FFoF, this sector includes mutual funds, money market funds,
closed-end funds, and exchange-traded funds (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System 2019); note that we include other funds for definition purposes. Generally speaking,
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these funds are professionally-run investing organizations which pool capital from investors
and invest that capital in a variety of assets to provide steady growth while reducing risk.
The capital is raised by selling shares in the fund.
Closed-End Fund. A closed-end fund differs from a mutual fund in that new shares
are not issued after an initial offering.
Exchange-Traded Fund. An exchange-traded fund invests similarly to a mutual
fund, but its shares are bought and sold on a stock exchange; therefore, the trade is
made with another investor, rather than with the fund directly.
HedgeFund. Ahedge fund is an investing organization run by professionalmanagers.
Hedge funds gather capital to invest generally from wealthier individuals and are
subject to less regulation than other types of funds (e.g., mutual funds); as such, they
are allowed greater discretion in their investment strategies. They may also borrow
capital to invest in a wider array of monies (called leveraging) to minimize (or hedge
against) risk.
Money Market Fund. A money market fund is a mutual fund which invests only in
high-credit, short-term securities.
Mutual Fund. Mutual funds are the largest of the four types of funds in this
sector. Here, they are open-ended mutual funds (meaning the fund can continue to
issue shares over time and therefore raise more capital to invest) which report to the
Investment Company Institute, an association representing regulated funds. Shares
in a mutual fund are bought from and sold to the fund itself.
Private Equity Fund. Similar to a hedge fund, a private equity fund pools capital
for investment from wealthier individuals (as well as some institutional investors).
However, private equity funds are so called because they generally focus on long-term
investments in private companies; the capital being invested often is used either to
provide financing to young companies or to enable poorly managed companies an
opportunity to improve (Maverick 2020).
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Government-Sponsored Enterprises (player). This sector includes financial service cor-
porations established by Congress with the goal of increasing accessibility to credit. The
organizations comprising the sector are the Federal Home Loan Banks, the Federal National
Mortgage Association (better known as Fannie Mae), the Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation (better known as FreddieMac), the Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation
(better known as Farmer Mac), the Farm Credit System, the Financing Corporation, and
the Resolution Funding Corporation (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
2019).
Holding Companies (player). This sector includes bank, savings and loan, U.S. interme-
diate, and securities holding companies, generally with at least $1 billion in assets (Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2019). A holding company (sometimes known
as a parent company) holds enough shares of at least one other company (a subsidiary) to
have a controlling interest in that subsidiary; the holding company generally does not run
the subsidiary’s operations and may or may have its own business operations.
Households (player). This sector includes individual households and non-profit organiza-
tions, such as charities, foundations, and schools. Data provided in the FFoF indicate hedge
funds, private equity funds, and personal trusts are also included (Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System 2019).
Insurance Companies (player). This sector includes both property-casualty and life insur-
ance companies. The sector does not include funds established by individual states to cover
their workers’ compensation programs (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
2019).
Property-Casualty Insurance Company. A property-casualty insurance company
is authorized to write most commonly known types of policies, such as homeowner’s
(or rental), car, private mortgage (PMI, also known as mortgage guaranty), and other
insurances (American Insurance Association 2020).
Life Insurance Companies. A life insurance company is authorized to write policies
providing beneficiaries with financial protection in case of death of the insured party;
for the FFoF, this includes all legal reserve life insurance companies. A company’s
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legal reserve is a minimum amount of money from each policy premium which the
company must set in reserve to ensure all policies can be paid.
Investment Banks (operator). Investment banks differ from commercial banks in key
ways. First, they are not depository institutions. Second, the services they offer are
more specialized; these include underwriting large debts (the process of assessing their
risk, which in turn determines the return those debts will generate), assisting with large
business transactions (e.g., mergers and acquisitions), and facilitating secondary markets
for securities by buying those securities when they are first issued and then reselling them
to individual investors. Note that many banks have both commercial and investment sides
after the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999.
Life Insurance Reserves (money, other markets). These monies are funds that life insur-
ance companies have established to pay for claims against their policies.
Loans (money, fixed-income market). These monies encompass two categories: depos-
itory institution loans not elsewhere classified (NEC) and other loans and advances. The
FFoF report includes two other categories (mortgages and consumer credit), but each is
large enough to warrant its own entry. Depository institution loans NEC and other loans
and advances primarily include loans which do not fall under mortgages, consumer credit,
or open market paper (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2019).
Market Makers (player and operator). A market maker is both a player and an operator
in the financial system; it is typically a firm which has committed to buying and selling
securities for certain companies on a financial exchange. The market maker will buy
securities from sellers and hold them until a buyer for those securities is available. Because
some securities do not trade regularly, this action promotes liquidity in the markets for those
securities.
Monetary Authority (player). This sector includes the banks of the Federal Reserve (of
which there are 12) and some select U.S. Treasury accounts, which are not included in
the Federal Government sector above (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
2019).
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Money Market (money, fixed-income market). The money market consists of securities
which have short maturities (less than a year). Monies in the moneymarket help participants
fund immediate operations, and they are generally considered to be safe investments because
they are most often issued by institutions with good credit. These monies are traded over-
the-counter (OTC)––that is, they are not traded on an established exchange but are instead
traded electronically between participants.
Mortgages (money, fixed-income market). These monies include any loan collateralized
by property. They include four sub-categories: home mortgages, for residential properties
with one to four residential units; multi-family residential mortgages, for properties with
more than four residential units; commercial mortgages, for non-residential properties; and
farm mortgages (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2019).
Municipal Securities (money, fixed-income market). These monies include debts of state
and local governments, non-profit organizations, and non-financial corporate businesses.
State and local governments issue most municipal securities, and they do so via either
general obligation or revenue bonds. The former is backed by the municipality, while the
latter is funded by revenue from a specific source, such as a toll road).
Non-Financial Corporate Business (player). This sector includes all private (i.e., not
publicly traded), for-profit corporations which do not provide financial services (Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2019). Because incorporation provides many
legal benefits, most businesses are corporations.
Non-Financial Non-Corporate Business (player). This sector includes partnerships, sole
proprietorships, limited liability companies, and individuals receiving rental income (Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2019).
LimitedLiability Company. The term limited liability refers to the idea that, at most,
an investor will lose the money he or she currently has invested with a business but is
otherwise not liable for the business’s debts. A limited liability company combines
this feature with the tax treatment of a partnership.
Partnership. A partnership is a small business run by at least two individuals, with
a few different arrangements possible which determine control of the business and
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assignment of liability. Two key purposes of partnerships are the sharing of liability
and preferential tax policies.
Sole Proprietorship. A sole proprietorship is a small business owned by one person
who pays income taxes on any profits the business earns.
Pension Entitlements (money, other markets). These monies include liabilities of all
retirement funds and annuities established by life insurance companies. They include
defined benefit and defined contribution plans, as well as individual retirement accounts
(IRAs) (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2019).
Personal Trust (player). A trust allows a separate manager to maintain assets on behalf
of the trust owner. Trusts are often used to reduce estate taxes. The term “personal” here
simply means privately held.
Private and Public Pension Funds (player). This sector includes all retirement funds
established by organizations in the private sector, state and local governments, and the
federal government. The retirement funds include defined benefit and defined contribution
plans; in the case of the federal government, the retirement fund does not include the Social
Security program (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2019). Defined
benefit plans are usually funded by the employer and pay the employee once he or she has
worked for the employer for a minimum time and retired; the amount paid usually depends
on how long the employee was with the employer and how much the employee made when
he or she retired. Defined contribution plans are usually funded by the employee, with
possible contributions from the employer; the employee controls how the money is invested
and can begin drawing on the assets after a certain age.
Proprietors’ Equity in Non-Corporate Business (player). These monies include own-
ership of non-financial non-corporate businesses and non-corporate security brokers and
dealers by households (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2019).
Rest of the World (player). This sector includes any foreign entity engaging in business in
the U.S. (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2019)
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Security Brokers and Dealers (player and operator). This sector includes businesses
which report to the SEC (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2019). A
broker-dealer completes securities trades for clients (as the broker) or on their own behalf
(as a dealer). The sector includes businesses which are brokers, dealers, or both; most are
both and are commonly thought of as brokerage firms.
State and Local Governments (player). This sector includes the governments of all 50
states and their municipalities, as well as Washington, D.C. It does not include other
U.S. territories, such as Puerto Rico and Guam (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System 2019).
Time and Savings Deposits (money, other markets). These monies include time deposits
and savings deposits. Time deposits bear interest and mature after a set time, such as a
certificate of deposit (Investopedia 2020). Savings deposits bear interest and cannot have
checks written against them; instead, they require notice of withdrawal.
Trade Credit (money, other markets). These monies are business-to-business contracts.
The contracts indicate the amount a buyer will pay a seller at a future date for goods or
services.
Treasury Securities (money, fixed-income markets). These monies include various types
of Treasury bills, notes, and bonds; securities from the Federal Financing Bank (an orga-
nization established by Congress which assists other federal agencies with borrowing and
lending); and Treasury inflation-protected securities, whose principal increases with infla-
tion and therefore protects the principal from loss due to inflation’s (Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System 2019).
Treasury Bill. A treasury bill is a short-term security. It does not provide any
interest; however, it provides an investor income because its par value (for which it is
redeemed upon maturity) is greater than its purchase price.
Treasury Bond. A treasury bond is similar to a treasury note but has a longer
maturity (greater than 10 years).
Treasury Inflation-protected Security (TIPS). ATIPS is a security whose par value
increases with inflation and which yields some interest; the par value is adjusted, and
86
the interest is paid semi-annually. Because the par value of a TIPS increases with
inflation, the principal is protected against loss due to inflation.
Treasury Note. A treasury note is a longer-term security (between one and 10 years)
which pays interest semi-annually and is redeemed at maturity for the par value.
U.S.-Chartered Depository Institutions (player). This sector includes federal savings
banks, commercial and savings banks which have received either federal or state autho-
rization to engage in banking practices (a charter), cooperative banks, savings and loan
associations, and international banking facilities. Assets and liabilities between institutions
within the sector are not included (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2019).
Commercial Bank. A commercial bank offers deposit and loan services, as well as
simple investment options for the public — that is, for individuals or businesses.
Cooperative Bank. A cooperative bank is owned by its customers. They offer
services similar to a commercial bank but are generally small and localized. Because
they are member-owned, the bank’s profits are returned to its members (Surbhi 2017).
International Banking Facilities. An international banking facility (IBF) allows
U.S.-chartered depository institutions to offer some banking services to foreign cit-
izens and organizations. IBFs must be maintained separately from core banking
operations.
Savings and Loan Association. A savings and loan association (SLA) offers many
of the same services as a commercial bank, although it tends to be locally-oriented
and focused on residential mortgages. Its ownership structure may be similar to that
of a cooperative bank, or it may be owned by shareholders.
Savings Bank. A savings bank collects money from clients and invests that money in
a conservatively (e.g., in Treasury securities) to provide interest to their clients. The
money invested is called a savings deposit and cannot be withdrawn without some
prior notice to the bank. This differs from a demand deposit, from which money
can be withdrawn without notice (e.g., from a checking account) (The Editors of
Encyclopaedia Britannica 2020).
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